Chapter 31 Learning the language of clinical reasoning
In this chapter we argue the case for a discursive view of clinical reasoning. We contend that becoming proficient at clinical reasoning is in large part a process of mastering, in particular, the language of a health profession and more broadly the language of healthcare systems. In learning to become competent in clinical reasoning, new practitioners must master a number of aspects of language; these include terminology, category systems, metaphors, heuristics, rituals, narrative, rhetoric and hermeneutics (Loftus 2006, Loftus & Higgs 2006). This interpretive view of clinical reasoning is in contrast to the current and more widespread view that clinical reasoning is, or should be, regarded as a phenomenon of computational logic and symbolic processing, combined with probability mathematics and statistics. The latter view is based within a more empirico-analytical paradigm and, we argue, is less useful as a conceptual model of clinical reasoning and how people come to learn this specialized skill. We draw both on the literature and on recent research (Loftus 2006) that utilized hermeneutic phenomenology to explore the nature of clinical decision making and how it is learned.
THE CENTRALITY OF LANGUAGE
Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of human beings is their use of language. A major problem with discussing language and its role in clinical reasoning is that for too many people language is mistakenly viewed as nothing more than a passive conduit by which meaning is transferred from the mind of one person to another. This is open to challenge. It can be argued that it is language that makes us human (Gadamer 1989). Language is central to human nature and to being human. Being immersed in a world of language allows us to construct meaning intersubjectively through the dialogue and interaction we have with others (Bakhtin 1986). The implication is that to understand reasoning of any kind, including clinical reasoning, we need to study the ways in which practitioners employ language and interaction to address clinical problems, rather than assuming that practitioners use objective mathematical methods to cope with tasks such as diagnosis.
In arguing for exclusively mathematical methods, Descartes (trans. Clarke 1999) made the error of rejecting Aristotle’s notion that different fields of knowledge require different methods and different means of proof. Aristotle (trans. Lawson-Tancred 1991) asserted that mathematical proofs normally have no place in a speech meant to persuade others. It can be argued that clinical reasoning is largely a matter of persuading oneself and others that a particular diagnosis and management plan is correct. Clinical reasoning is therefore a discursive construction of meaning, negotiated with patients, their carers, other health professionals, but above all with oneself. To become proficient at clinical reasoning, health professionals must therefore become proficient in the language skills required to persuade people.
LANGUAGE SKILLS OF CLINICAL REASONING
In recent doctoral research Loftus (Loftus 2006, Loftus & Higgs 2006) sought to gain a deeper understanding of the place of language in clinical reasoning. He studied settings where health professionals and medical students engaged in clinical decision making in groups, including problem-based learning (PBL) tutorials and a multidisciplinary clinic.
TERMINOLOGY/KEY WORDS
Mastering the terminology of a health profession is a basic skill in clinical reasoning, which forms the foundation for the other skills required. This is a matter not just of knowing particular words and phrases, but more importantly, of knowing how and when to use them appropriately. For example, one medical student spoke of acquiring basic skills in psychiatry:
METAPHOR
Lakoff & Johnson (1980) argued that thought and language are fundamentally metaphorical. Metaphor is not simply an embellishment of language exploited by writers and poets. It can be argued that language and thought are intensely and inherently metaphorical and, because of this, metaphor use goes largely unnoticed as it is so completely natural to us (Ortony 1993). In recent years there has been a growing recognition of the extent to which metaphor underlies scientific and medical practice and shapes the ways in which both health professionals and their patients conceptualize their health problems and what can be done about them (e.g. Draaisma 2001, Reisfield & Wilson 2004).
A key metaphor underlying the biomedical model is ‘The body is a machine’. This is also the underlying metaphor through which patients in Western societies tend to conceptualize their bodily problems (Hodgkin 1985). The implication of this metaphor is that we can always, in principle at least, repair a broken machine. In acute care this metaphor could be appropriate. However, the metaphor frequently falls down in the chronic situation where repeated attempts at repair fail, resulting in frustration and disappointment for both patients and health professionals. Often such patients are ‘discarded’ by the system as ‘failed’ patients (Alder 2003).
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