12 Devyn M. Smith Neusentis Research Unit, Pfizer Worldwide R&D, UK Stem cells have been used successfully for over 50 years in the treatment of patients in the context of bone-marrow transplant [1]. However, over the last 15 years the use of stem cells as potential therapies has been subject to both high levels of hype and a lack of significant commercial success, since the first embryonic stem cells were discovered in the late 1990s [2]. While regenerative medicine is a billion-dollar industry today, it is still quite small given a single drug can generate many billions of dollars in revenue [3]. This apparent lack of commercial success could be attributed to a variety of factors, including lack of significant funding, limited success of clinical trials, uncertainty around business models [4], and an overall misunderstanding of stem-cell biology by the public. However, there are some key learnings that can be culled from the regenerative medicine industry over the last 15 years. This chapter will focus on addressing some questions surrounding these, including: A key question is: How does commercialization of cell-based products differ from commercialization of other traditional medical therapies? We can evaluate three major categories of medical therapies: small molecules, biologics (large molecules), and medical devices. Small molecules have been commercialized for years using traditional approaches in marketing, such as hiring large numbers of sales reps to detail physicians (both primary care and specialists) in order to provide widespread information about the product [5]. The key to success is strong marketing, competitive differentiation from other products, and low cost of goods (COG), which can drive both revenue and profitability [6]. While biologics have traditionally been focused on specialist markets, given their overall higher pricing, the detailing and push to reduce COG are critical for profitability and the overall model is not significantly different from that of small molecules. The primary difference is that most biologic products must usually be kept cold (storage temperatures vary), which presents important logistical considerations versus small molecules. Reimbursement for both types of product is similar, although biologics are often more expensive than small molecules. In addition, both biologic- and small molecule-based products can cost many hundreds of millions of dollars and can take 10 or more years from early discovery to market launch [7]. However, once an asset is on the market, it enjoys exclusivity for a period of time, until patent expiry (which in some cases can be 10 or more years post-launch). While loss of market exclusivity typically results in a small-molecule product losing 80% or more of revenue within a year or two, biologics have yet to be significantly impacted by loss of exclusivity. In fact, although several biologics have experienced patent expiry there are few launched generics or biosimilars on the market, with those that have launched experiencing minimal commercial revenue [8]. Medical devices are typically complex pieces of metal and/or plastic sold primarily to surgeons or other specialists. Companies selling these devices utilize a different commercialization model from that for small and large molecules. Medical devices typically have higher COG than small molecules or biologics [9]. There are several reasons for this, including the higher production costs, relatively lower selling price, and need for more complex sales-force detailing. A typical medical-device sales rep will often be present and assist in the training of physicians in the use of the device, which builds a strong relationship with the physician but also results in higher costs for the selling company [10]. In addition, while the product lifecycle for biopharmaceuticals is long, that for a medical device is quite short, given the perpetual innovation that occurs in this space. This means companies must rapidly develop new products without the long R&D cycles common with biopharmaceuticals. Given the very different business models and COG, there are few companies that sell products which use both the device and the traditional drug model. Johnson & Johnson (J&J) is the one large-company exception, as it has been successful selling both medical devices and traditional small-molecule and biologic products [11]. Most other companies in the space are focused on either traditional biopharmaceuticals or medical devices. The models described here are well-established in the market, such that physicians, sales reps, manufacturers, payers, and even patients are comfortable with them, despite their differences. How does cell-based therapy fit into this? Such therapies can possess elements from both the biopharmaceutical model and the medical-device model [12]. For example, a cell-based therapy will likely require some type of cold-chain distribution, not unlike biologics. However, it may require more complex provisioning and hence a field force that is more akin to that for a medical device. This mix of models makes cell-based therapies problematic for both traditional medical-device manufacturers who are not familiar with cold-chain logistics and distribution and biopharmaceutical companies that are not familiar with the complex sales and marketing requirements of devices, not to mention the relatively lower gross margins. In addition, the business model will differ between an autologous and an allogeneic therapy [13]. We will not delve into the business-model and scientific differences between allogeneic and autologous therapies, as this has been covered elsewhere [4, 9, 12,13]. However, J&J demonstrates that it is possible for a company to be expert in both business models, and it is therefore likely that once commercial cell-based products are on the market, medical-device and biopharmaceutical companies will adapt to be successful in selling them. There have been several cell-based products launched over the last 15 years [9, 12, 13]. Table 12.1 highlights the largest revenue-generating products that have launched. There were three key launches in the 1990s: Carticel (sold by Genzyme, now part of Sanofi-Aventis), Dermagraft (launched by Advanced Tissue Sciences (ATS) and now sold by Advanced Biohealing (ABH)/Shire), and Apligraf (sold by Organogenesis). Each of these has had a storied history that has been quite challenging at times. Today, Dermagraft and Apligraf are both generating more than $100 million in revenue, with double-digit growth, while Carticel has been selling <$50 million for the better part of a decade. Dendreon recently launched Provenge, providing a more recent example that we can learn from. We will review Dermagraft (as representative of the other two products) and Provenge to evaluate what has gone right and what has not for these products since their launches. Table 12.1 Key cell-based products E = estimated from various sources, *= data from 2010, **= from Evaluate, Large Companies, rest of data from company 10Ks A detailed case study of Dermagraft was published in 2010 [14], covering the key aspects of the company, ATS, that initially developed and marketed the product. ATS filed for bankruptcy and was liquidated in 2003 after never making a profit in 14 years. This discussion will not replay the company’s fate, given the prior published case study was thorough and informative. The key facts from this case study are: It is clear that several key elements led to ATS’s eventual failure as a company despite it having a launched product on the market. These include: a lack of focus on driving revenue, with a weak internal sales/reimbursement team; difficulty in marketing a novel and expensive product to a market used to relatively simple, inexpensive treatments such as dressings; and a lack of strategic focus, resulting in a lot of “wasted” R&D spend. Dermagraft was eventually sold to ABH for $7 million in 2006, and ABH relaunched the product and grew it to more than $100 million in revenue by 2011. ABH was recently purchased by Shire for $750 million, highlighting the success of the relaunched Dermagraft [15]. Why was ABH so successful relative to ATS? The keys to its success are its focus on exactly the things that ATS failed to focus on – namely sales and reimbursement, creating a clear sales and marketing strategy to target key physicians, and making Dermagraft successful without spending significant R&D dollars on any other pipeline products. Dendreon Corporation is a biotech company headquartered in Seattle, Washington. It was founded in 1992. It took 18 years and $1.2 billion (aggregate losses from 1992 to 2010, with another $750 million from 2010 to 2012 post-launch) before its first product, Provenge (sipuleucel-T), was approved in April 2010 for the treatment of asymptomatic or minimally symptomatic metastatic castrate-resistant (hormone-refractory) prostate cancer [16]. Dendreon is focused on developing treatments for cancer using active cellular immunotherapy (ACI). ACI uses a patient’s own white blood cells to destroy the tumor. In the case of Provenge, a patient’s white blood cells are harvested using Leukapheresis and sent to the Dendreon manufacturing facility. The cells are then activated using a complex manufacturing process and returned to the infusion center to be infused back into the patient. The time from final manufacturing to infusion must be less than 18 hours, which can present logistical challenges for the company, patients, and physicians. Because of this short time window, Dendreon has built three manufacturing sites such that the entire United States is within a short flight or drive from one of them. The course of treatment is three infusions, one every 2 weeks for 6 weeks, and it has led to 4 months of improved survival in clinical studies [17]. When Provenge was approved, the expectations for the product were extremely high. In fact, some analysts forecasted peak revenue at $4 billion [18]. However, 18 months later they were predicting no more than $500 million in peak revenue from the drug [18]. What had changed? There were several factors, including the launch of new competitor drugs and commercialization and reimbursement challenges at Dendreon. One of the competing drugs, Zytiga, was launched by J&J in April 2011 for patients with late-stage (metastatic) castration-resistant prostate cancer in combination with prednisone (a steroid) who have received prior docetaxel (chemotherapy) [19]. Zytiga extends life expectancy 4–5 months and is estimated to generate $1.7 billion in peak revenue [20]. In addition, Medivation and Astellas had Xtandi approved in September 2012. Zytiga is a small molecule and prices at $5500 a month ($66 000 annual), as versus Provenge’s price of $93 000 for a course of treatment and Xtandi’s $85 000 annually. Xtandi has peak forecasts at $2.2 billion [21]. In effect, the market has moved quickly to small-molecule products that offer similar or better efficacy in a much simpler treatment procedure for both patients and providers. Dendreon had a full year’s lead on the competition but was not able to capitalize on this advantage. This was due to the commercialization and reimbursement challenges the company faced. Given the drug used a new business model, the company struggled to determine the optimal way to commercialize it. Physicians had to treat the patients and then be at risk of having to pay Dendreon the $93 000 cost of the drug if the insurance company did not reimburse them. This made them very nervous. Meanwhile, a patient who needed small-molecule therapy could get that from the pharmacy, with no financial risk for the physician. Medicare was willing to reimburse physicians for Provenge, but many physicians, particularly those in community practices, were wary. It has taken several years to educate these physicians about the reimbursement on offer [22]. In fact, the company had just begun to see an increase in the number of community physicians who use Provenge in the fourth quarter of 2012 [23]. This business-model challenge became an acute issue when the company warned in mid-2011 that it would not reach its guidance for 2011 revenue, resulting in a 60% drop in its stock price [24].
Practicalities to Translation from the Clinic to the Market
12.1 Introduction
12.2 Commercialization Comparison with Small Molecules, Medical Devices, and Biologics
12.3 Historical Review and Case Studies
Company
Product
Therapeutic Area
Launch
2011 WW Revenue
Growth ’10-’11
Dendreon
Provenge
Oncology
2010
$213M
344%
Advanced Biohealing/Shire
Dermagraft
Skin
1997
∼$200M
35%
Organogenesis
Apligraf
Skin
1998
∼$102M*
25%*
Osiris/Nuvasive
FormaGraft, Osteocel Plus
Bone
2005
$99M
10%
Genzyme/Sanofi
Carticel
Cartilage
1995
∼$32M**
<5%
Cytori
Celution
Soft Tissue (adipose)
2008 (ex-US)
∼$8M
0%
Tigenix
ChondroCelect
Cartilage
2009 (ex-US)
∼∼$1.6M
85%
Cell Based $665M Market in 2011 with 25%+ growth
12.3.1 Dermagraft
12.3.2 Provenge