CHAPTER 12 Organ and tissue donation
12.1 Human tissue
[12.1.1] What is human tissue?
The legislation excludes fetal tissue, spermatozoa and ova from the definition. These tissues are discussed in chapter 15.
The relevant legislation is in table 12.1.1.
Table 12.1.1 Legislation relating to human tissue
ACT | Transplantation & Anatomy Act 1978 ss 4, 6 |
NSW | Human Tissue Act 1983 ss 4, 6 |
NT | Human Tissue Transplant Act 1979 ss 4, 6 |
Qld | Transplantation & Anatomy Act 1979 ss 4, 8 |
SA | Transplantation & Anatomy Act 1983 ss 5, 7 |
Tas | Human Tissue Act 1985 ss 3, 5 |
Vic | Human Tissue Act 1982 ss 3, 5 |
WA | Human Tissue & Transplant Act 1982 ss 3, 6 |
[12.1.2] Who owns human tissue?
The general rule is that no-one owns human tissue; the law regards human tissue as a res nullius, a ‘thing belonging to no-one’. This rule applies to all human tissue, and to corpses. There is a general right given to the executors of a deceased estate to keep possession of the corpse for burial, but this is a very weak form of property right. The effect of this rule is that the common law is challenged by situations of competing claims to human tissue, because it cannot easily access the property language that it might have ordinarily employed.
12.2 Donation by adults
[12.2.2] How is the donation of other regenerative tissues regulated?
[12.2.3] Are adults permitted to donate non-regenerative tissue?
Before the rise of transplantation technology, the common law forbade the donation of non-regenerative tissue because it saw it as a form of bodily interference that a person could not consent to: see [6.1.11]. Now, adults can donate non-regenerative tissue under certain circumstances.
[12.2.4] Can regenerative and non-regenerative tissue be taken from an incompetent adult?
Decision-making for incompetent patients is discussed in chapter 8. The basic principle is that medical interventions can only be consented to by a substitute decision-maker when it is in the person’s best interests. Because donation of tissue confers no therapeutic benefit on the donor, it is harder to justify on best interests grounds.
Other substitute decision-makers, such as persons responsible, guardians and enduring guardians, are not empowered to consent to ‘special’ treatment. In Queensland and Victoria any removal of tissue (whether regenerative or non-regenerative) is considered as ‘special healthcare’ (Queensland) or a ‘special procedure’ (Victoria), requiring the consent of the Queensland Guardianship and Administrative Tribunal or the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal: see [8.5.1]. In the ACT and Tasmania, only the removal of non-regenerative tissue requires guardianship authority approval: see [8.5.1]. In New South Wales, the Guardianship Tribunal, guardians, enduring guardians and persons responsible are unable to consent to the donation of either regenerative or non-regenerative tissue. Consent can only be obtained from the New South Wales Supreme Court.
In Northern Sydney and Central Coast Area Health Service v CT (by his Tutor ET) [2005] NSWSC 551, consent was given by the NSW Supreme Court to the donation of bone marrow by an intellectually disabled adult, CT, to his brother, NT, who suffered from non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. Consent could not be given by CT’s other relatives because their power as persons responsible was limited to treatments that promoted and maintained CT’s health and wellbeing. Donating bone marrow served no therapeutic purpose for CT, and as such did not promote his physical welfare.

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