Donor-Derived Infections
Latent Infections in the Donor Viral infections latent in the donor have by far the greatest potential for transmission by the transplanted organ and exert a more profound clinical impact in the allograft recipient compared with many other donor-transmitted infections. Thus, serologic screening of the donor for hepatitis B virus (HBV), hepatitis C virus (HCV), CMV, EBV, and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) is routinely recommended (
9). Nonviral infections (e.g., toxoplasmosis) are also discussed here.
Hepatitis B Virus The risk of transmission of HBV varies according to the HBV serologic profile of the donor and the recipient and the type of organ transplanted (liver vs. nonliver). Transplantation of allografts from hepatitis B surface antigen (HBsAg)-positive donors carries the highest risk of HBV transmission and is recommended only in life-threatening situations. IgM antibody to hepatitis B core antigen (anti-HBc IgM) positivity indicates either recent or current infection; it should be managed as in HBsAgpositive donors. Anti-HBc IgG positivity in the absence of HBsAg poses a low likelihood of transmission of HBV. The liver may continue to harbor the replicative form of HBV in such donors with the potential of HBV transmission even in the presence of anti-HBs
(10). Donors with isolated anti-HBc positivity should be considered infectious, especially for the hepatic allograft. Indeed, 78% (18/23) of the liver transplant recipients from donors with isolated
anti-HBc experienced HBV transmission
(11). Transplantation of an anti-HBc-positive liver into a nonimmune recipient should be performed only if deemed medically urgent and under a prophylactic regimen of lamivudine with or without hepatitis B immune globulin (HBIG)
(12,
13). However, the risk of HBV transmission for recipients of nonhepatic organs is low. None of the seven heart transplant recipients and 2.3% (1/42) of the renal transplant recipients who received organs from isolated anti-HBc-positive donors became infected
(14). General consensus is that the organs from anti-HBc positive donors should be used for recipients who are HBsAg positive or who have evidence of HBV immunity. The risk of HBV transmission from anti-HBc-positive donors to nonhepatic organ recipients can be further stratified based on the presence of HBV DNA in the serum at the time of transplantation (
15) as the risk is considered negligible if serum HBV DNA is negative. The use of anti-HBc-positive nonhepatic allografts has not been associated with poor outcomes
(16,
17). Anti-HBs-positive liver donors who are negative for both HBsAg and anti-HBc are generally considered unlikely to transmit HBV. Anti-HBs positivity is usually explained by HBV vaccination or administration of hepatitis B immunoglobulin. However, the potential for HBV transmission can still exist for donors with isolated anti-HBs positivity since HBV DNA may be detectable in the hepatic allografts
(18).
The most important measure to prevent HBV transmission is the administration of HBV vaccine to nonimmune transplant candidates. However, HBV transmission may occur even if recipients are immune to HBV (positive anti-HBs status). Transplantation of any organs from HBsAgpositive donors should be ideally avoided. If a recipient emergently needs an organ from HBsAg-positive donors due to life-threatening situations, the recipient should receive HBIG and prophylactic antiviral therapy with lamivudine for a minimum of 1 year with close monitoring of liver enzymes, HBsAg, anti-HBs, and HBV DNA. Liver transplant from an IgG anti-HBc-positive donor should be managed in a similar manner. HBV-immune candidates can receive extrahepatic organs from an IgG anti-HBc-positive donor without any prophylaxis; however, posttransplant surveillance for liver enzymes, HBsAg, anti-HBs, and HBV DNA are recommended. If potential candidates are not immune to HBV, HBIG, and/or lamivudine are typically administered. The duration of prophylaxis depends on the presence of the donor HBV DNA. If the donor HBV DNA at the time of transplant is negative, prophylaxis may be discontinued. If the donor HBV DNA is positive or unknown, HBIG for >3 to 6 months or lamivudine for >12 months should be continued (
13,
15).
Hepatitis C Virus Approximately 5% of all cadaveric organ donors are positive for antibody to HCV (anti-HCV), and 50% of these have detectable HCV viremia by PCR
(19). Nearly all the recipients from anti-HCV-positive donors become infected with HCV (
20). Donor-derived HCV infection is associated with rapid progression of fibrosis and high mortality
(21). Transplantation of livers from HCV-positive donors into HCV-positive recipients has not been associated with a decrease in graft or patient survival up to 8 years
(22,
23 and 24). Most transplant centers use HCV-positive extrahepatic organs only for HCV-positive recipients, because there are data suggesting that donor HCV-positive status is independently associated with decreased survival regardless of recipient HCV status
(25,
26). The use of anti-HCV-positive organs in anti-HCV-negative recipients should be avoided; however, it may be considered in lifethreatening situations. Unlike HBV, no effective measures to prevent HCV transmission are currently available.
Herpesviruses The donor allograft is a significant and an efficient source of transmission of CMV
(27,
28). The morbidity from infection is greatest in CMV-seronegative recipients of CMV-positive allografts. Superinfection (i.e., infection with an exogenous strain of CMV in patients with prior evidence of CMV infection) has also been documented. Symptomatic CMV disease occurred more frequently in patients infected with the new CMV strain compared with those with reactivation of the latent virus
(29). Donor transmission (documented by molecular typing) has also been demonstrated with other herpesviruses, including herpes simplex virus (HSV), varicella zoster virus (VZV), Epstein-Barr virus (EBV), and human herpesvirus-6 (HHV-6)
(30,
31,
32,
33 and 34). EBV-seronegative recipients of EBV-positive allografts are at highest risk of developing EBV-associated posttransplant lymphoproliferative disorder, especially among intestinal transplant recipients
(35,
36). Transmission of herpesviruses from donors to recipients is not preventable; however, identification of recipients is at high risk (i.e., seronegative recipients) followed by use of antiviral prophylaxis (CMV, HSV) with or without monitoring of viral replication and close clinical follow-up with symptoms is crucial. Management issues of herpesviruses infection are discussed later in this chapter.
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Donor positivity for HIV by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) is considered an absolute contraindication to organ donation. There is a remote possibility that HIV can be transmitted from donors who test negative for HIV antibody if the time of transplantation is during the window period or if the test is falsenegative due to resuscitation-associated hemodilution.
Recently, transmission of HIV was reported in three organ recipients from a donor who had sex with men who tested negative for HIV antibody (
37,
38,
39). Scrutinizing the donor’s behavioral and medical risks of HIV in a limited time frame followed by weighing these risks against the benefits of transplantation are critically important (
40). Use of special consent forms for transplantation of organs from high-risk donors has been utilized in many transplant centers. Although more sensitive nucleic acid amplification assays are available, the cost and delayed turnover time may prohibit their routine use.
Human T-Cell Lymphotrophic Virus Type 1/2 Human T-cell Lymphotrophic Virus Type 1/2 (HTLV-1/2) is a retrovirus with marked geographically variant prevalence from 0.035% to 0.046% in the United States blood donors to 30% in Southern Japan
(41,
42). UNOS data revealed that the prevalence of HTLV-1 and HTLV-2 among the US organ donors is 0.027% and 0.046%, respectively
(43). Although HTLV-1 is associated with the development of acute T-cell lymphoma and HTLV-1-associated myelopathy, the majority of these patients remain asymptomatic. Only a few cases of documented transmission and development of HTLV-1-associated disease in solid organ transplant
recipients have been reported
(44,
45). HTLV-2 does not appear to be associated with the clinical syndrome. The OPTN/UNOS Ad Hoc Disease Transmission Advisory Committee recently recommended against routine screening for HTLV-1/2 given the lack of routine availability of some commercial assays, a high false-positive rate leading to the waste of organs, favorable short-term follow-up of recipients of HTLV-1/2 screen positive organs, and low prevalence of the disease in the United States
(46).
Mycobacterium tuberculosis Transmission of
M. tuberculosis to recipients receiving allografts from donors with active tuberculosis has been documented. Transmission of
M. tuberculosis to two renal transplant recipients from a donor with unrecognized tuberculous meningitis at the time of organ retrieval has been reported
(47). Tuberculin-positive donors without clinically overt tuberculosis may also transmit tuberculosis. Tuberculin-positive living donors should receive chemoprophylaxis after appropriate workup to rule out active tuberculosis if delay of transplant is acceptable. It is recommended that the recipients of allografts from donors with latent tuberculosis or a history of tuberculosis should receive chemoprophylaxis for tuberculosis after transplantation
(47).
Toxoplasma gondii Toxoplasma gondii, because of its predilection for latency in muscle tissue, poses a substantial risk for transmission of toxoplasmosis in heart transplant recipients. In the absence of prophylaxis, 50% to 70% of the seronegative recipients of
T. gondii antibody-positive allografts have developed toxoplasmosis
(48). Heart transplant donors and recipients should be serotested to determine the risk for toxoplasmosis. Because of the paucity of
Toxoplasma cysts in noncardiac tissue, toxoplasmosis is rarely transmitted by the nonheart organs and pretransplant screening is controversial in this population
(49). Prophylactic use of trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole significantly decreases the risk of developing toxoplasmosis posttransplant in heart transplant recipients (
50,
51). Some experts administer a higher dose of trimethoprimsulfamethoxazole or a combination of pyrimethamine and sulfadiazine to high-risk patients (seronegative recipients of a seropositive heart).
Trypanosoma cruzi Trypanosoma cruzi is an endemic parasitic disease in Latin America (American trypanosomiasis). It is transmitted by the triatomine insect, but blood transfusion, maternal-fetal transmission, and organ transplant are also the major routes of transmission in a nonendemic area
(52,
53). Donor screening should be performed for those who lived or traveled in an endemic area. Organs from donors positive for
T. cruzi should not be utilized especially for heart transplant given its fatal outcomes
(54). If nonheart organs are utilized in emergent situations, aggressive monitoring with direct parasitological tests and/or PCR-based assays (
51).
Other Pathogens Transmission of endemic fungi including
Histoplasma capsulatum and
Coccidioides immitus via donor allograft has been reported
(55,
56). Although active fungal infections should be excluded prior to procurement, no consensus exists with regard to donor screening for latent fungal infection. West Nile virus (WNV), rabies, and lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus (LCMV) are the examples of emerging pathogens that have been reported to be donor derived
(57,
58 and 59).
Acquired Infections in the Donor Life-sustaining measures in critically ill donors may render them susceptible to healthcare-associated infections with the potential for transmission to allograft recipients. Two recent studies comprising a large number of patients have shown that donor bacteremia did not portend a higher risk of infectious complications or compromise graft or patient survival
(60,
61). The most frequent cause of the donor bacteremias in these studies was gram-positive bacteria, of which
Staphylococcus aureus was the predominant pathogen. Most recipients of organs retrieved from bacteremic donors in the aforementioned studies received antimicrobial therapy. In the study by Lumbreras et al.
(60), specific antibiotics were administered to the recipients for 7 to 10 days on receipt of donor blood culture results. In the report by Freeman et al.
(61), 91% of the recipients received antibiotics for a mean of 3.8 days. These data suggest that with appropriately administered antibiotic therapy, organs from bacteremic donors can be successfully transplanted without incurring an additional risk for infection or allograft dysfunction in the recipient.
A similar dilemma exists regarding the feasibility of using organs from donors with bacterial meningitis
(62). Lopez-Navidad et al.
(62) described the outcome in 16 recipients who had received organs from five patients with bacterial meningitis. The pathogens included
Neisseria meningitidis, Streptococcus pneumoniae, and
E. coli. With antibiotic administration ranging from 5 to 10 days, infection caused by the aforementioned bacteria was not documented in any of the recipients. Thus, patients with brain death attributable to bacterial meningitis caused by these bacteria can also be suitable organ donors, if the donor and the recipient receive appropriate antibiotic therapy. An exception, however, is donors with a less commonly encountered bacterial infection, that is,
M. tuberculosis. Unrecognized active
M. tuberculosis infection in the donor can be efficiently transmitted to the recipient with deleterious sequelae. Moreover, caution must be exercised when transplantation from donors with a presumptive diagnosis of bacterial meningitis is considered.
Donor organs colonized with
Candida or
Aspergillus may transmit the fungi to lung and heart-lung transplant recipients. Karyotypic analysis of the
Candida albicans isolates demonstrated identical strains from the donor lung and
C. albicans isolates causing disseminated infection in a lung transplant recipient
(63). Donor organs have also been documented to transmit other fungal infections (e.g.,
Cryptococcus neoformans and
Histoplasma capsulatum)
(64).
Environmental Reservoirs and Sources
Environmental sources are significant sites for acquisition of a number of infectious agents, particularly healthcareassociated pathogens in transplant recipients (
Table 58-1). Most cases of
Legionella in solid organ transplant recipients are healthcare-associated
(69). The source of posttransplant legionellosis in all studies where an environmental link was sought was the hospital’s potable water distribution system
(5). Restriction fragment length polymorphism patterns documented that the hospital’s central hot water supply was the source of legionellosis in a hospital where 14 cases were documented in transplant recipients over an 8-year period
(70). Healthcare-associated legionellosis in heart-lung transplant recipients at one institution was linked to a contaminated ice machine
(71).
Outbreaks of invasive aspergillosis in transplant recipients have been linked to construction or demolition activity within or near a hospital; contaminated or poorly maintained ventilation ducts, grids, or air filters; and other dust-generating activities that may aerosolize
Aspergillus spores. Accommodation of marrow transplant recipients outside of rooms with laminar air flow and high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters during periods of neutropenia have been shown to be a risk factor for invasive aspergillosis
(72). A seasonal variation in the incidence of invasive aspergillosis, coinciding with a high outdoor concentration of airborne spores in late summer or fall and a lower concentration in the winter months, has also been observed. The prevailing belief that
Aspergillus is predominantly an airborne pathogen acquired via inhalation has recently been challenged. It has been proposed that
Fusarium and
Aspergillus can be detected in hospital water systems, and aspiration, as opposed to inhalation of
Aspergillus, may be the mode of acquisition of healthcare-associated invasive aspergillosis in susceptible hosts
(73).
The prevailing assumption has been that
P. jirovecii infection arises from reactivation of endogenous infections
acquired in childhood. However, healthcare-associated patient-to-patient transmission and environmental contamination of
P. jirovecii has also been documented
(74,
75). A cluster of renal transplant recipients who developed PJP shared the same strain confirmed by multilocus DNA sequence typing
(76,
77). P. jirovecii DNA has been demonstrated in more than 50% of the air samples from the hospital rooms of
P. jirovecii-infected patients
(78). It remains to be determined whether isolation of patients with PJP decreases the incidence of PJP, though such trials would be difficult in the current era of routine anti-PJP prophylaxis.
VRE and methicillin-resistant
S. aureus (MRSA) have become established as endemic pathogens in many institutions and are increasingly recognized as significant microorganisms in transplant recipients. At many centers, VRE, MRSA, or
Clostridium difficile are currently the most frequent etiologic agents of infections in transplant recipients. Although patient-specific variables (e.g., severity of illness, intensity of antimicrobial use, and length of hospital stay) are risk factors for acquisition, environmental contamination and, more importantly, person-to-person transmission are also considered significant factors in the healthcare-associated spread of these bacteria. Equipment and surfaces in the vicinity of patients colonized and infected with VRE have been shown to become contaminated with VRE; VRE could be recovered for at least 7 days from the surfaces of countertops and after 30 minutes from the stethoscopes
(79). Furthermore, epidemiologic studies have documented healthcare-associated VRE transmission by molecular typing techniques
(80). Likewise, pulse-field gel electrophoresis demonstrated that 43% of the MRSA isolates causing invasive infections at a transplant unit shared the same pattern, suggesting healthcare-associated transmission
(80).
C. difficile is currently the most common cause of infectious diarrhea in transplant recipients. Liver transplantation was identified as the most significant independent risk factor for
C. difficile acquisition in one report
(81). Although the precise mode of transmission of
C. difficile has not been determined, environmental contamination and healthcareassociated transmission are the likely mode of transmission of
C. difficile; however, airborne dispersal of spores could be another important source
(82,
83). C. difficile was recovered from 9% to 51% of the environmental cultures; objects contaminated with feces (e.g., bed pan, toilet seats, sinks, and scales were most likely to yield
C. difficile)
(84). Positive hand cultures were documented in 59% of the hospital personnel caring for the patients with
C. difficile, implicating hands of hospital personnel as a likely mode of transmission
(85). Prudent use of antimicrobial agents and measures to curtail healthcare-associated transmission are key toward effective prevention of infections caused by these pathogens.