Healthcare-Associated Infections in Anesthesia



Healthcare-Associated Infections in Anesthesia


Loreen A. Herwaldt

Matthew D. Koff

Randy W. Loftus

Jean M. Pottinger



INTRODUCTION

Modern anesthesiology originated in the 1800s (1). William Clark was reportedly the first person to use ether as an anesthetic, administering it initially during a tooth extraction (1,2). Soon thereafter, other healthcare providers followed suit, including William T. G. Morton, a dentist, and John Collins Warren, a professor of surgery at Harvard, who both utilized ether for anesthetic purposes (1). From the very beginning, anesthesiology attracted physicians with a broad range of clinical interests and skill sets. It is, therefore, not surprising that Dr. John Snow, an early British anesthesiologist who calculated dosages for chloroform and ether, conducted epidemiologic studies that elucidated the source of the cholera epidemic in Soho, London, in 1854. His data convinced the local council to remove the handle of the Broad Street pump (3, 4 and 5). Thus, both modern anesthesiology and epidemiology have similar roots.

Snow further developed his epidemiological expertise over time, but he did not address the potential relationship between the practice of general anesthesia and healthcareassociated infections (HAIs). This question was first raised in 1873 by Skinner, a physician interested in the infection control and prevention practices of anesthesiologists (6). Since then, numerous anesthesia personnel have investigated whether anesthesia equipment and medications transmit infections to patients, and numerous groups have published infection prevention and control guidelines and practice advisories specifically for anesthesia practice (7,8,9,10, 11, 12 and 13,14, 15, 16 and 17,18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27). In addition, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has published guidelines that are relevant to anesthesia practice (28,29, 30, 31, 32 and 33).

However, despite these guidelines and despite advances in anesthetic practices, surgical techniques, sterilization, and disinfection, HAIs continue to complicate healthcare, including procedures done by anesthesia providers. Some of the anesthetic and surgical advancements have increased the complexity of patient care, thereby providing more reservoirs for pathogens and more opportunities for these pathogens to cause infections. Moreover, multidrugresistant bacteria cause many HAIs, further complicating care (30). Given the human and monetary costs of these infections, numerous governments have created programs that encourage healthcare providers to adopt best practices and implement other preventive measures. In the United States, for example, the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) will no longer reimburse healthcare facilities for the excess costs associated with some HAIs (34). Thus, healthcare facilities and healthcare providers have additional incentives to study transmission of pathogenic microorganisms, risk factors for HAIs, and preventive measures in all healthcare settings, including those in which anesthesia providers work (e.g., operating rooms, preanesthesia and postanesthesia rooms, and pain clinics).

This chapter summarizes the available literature pertaining to the potential role of anesthetic practice and
equipment in intraoperative transmission of pathogens and subsequent HAIs. We review the pathogenesis and epidemiology of infections potentially related to the administration of anesthesia (general, neuraxial, and intravenous), describe and critique reports of outbreaks in which anesthesia personnel may have been the reservoirs of infection, and discuss various anesthetic practices that put either anesthesia providers or patients at risk for exposure to potential pathogens. In addition, we summarize recent studies that have assessed measures for preventing intraoperative bacterial transmission, subsequent HAIs, and occupationally acquired infections.


The Pathogenesis of HAIs Hospital-Wide

Many HAIs are acquired because pathogenic microorganisms are transmitted within the healthcare setting by healthcare workers who do not follow basic precautions that prevent spread, such as those described by the CDC (30,31). For example, healthcare workers may be more likely to follow Standard Precautions and practice good hand hygiene if the patient has an obvious infection than they are if the patient does not have an apparent infection. Consequently, healthcare workers may not do hand hygiene or may not use other precautions that could prevent spread of pathogenic microorganisms from a patient’s normal flora (e.g., Escherichia coli in the gastrointestinal tract) or from an occult infection. In fact, contaminated hands are the major vector for transmission in the healthcare setting (31,35, 36, 37, 38 and 39). Hayden et al. (35) demonstrated how easy it is for healthcare workers to contaminate their hands. Of 103 healthcare workers (HCWs) whose hand cultures were negative when they entered the room of a patient colonized with vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE), 52% contaminated their hands or gloves after touching the environment and 70% contaminated their hands or gloves after touching the patient and the environment. HCWs who wore gloves were significantly less likely to contaminate their hands (5%) despite touching more sites than HCWs who did not wear gloves (37%). Thus, noncompliance with simple preventative measures, such as hand hygiene and Contact Precautions, increases the likelihood that HCWs will transmit pathogenic microorganisms to the next patients they care for or to the environment, which can then serve as a reservoir, particularly for microorganisms such as VRE that survive on environmental surfaces for prolonged periods (35). We must, therefore, study work patterns and practices in various hospital settings, including the operating room and other places where anesthesia providers work, to identify those patterns and practices that enhance transmission of pathogens from patient to patient or from patients to the environment. We must also identify interventions that prevent transmission within specific work environments, such as operating rooms.


Epidemiology of Postoperative HAIs Occurring after General Anesthesia

General Comments General anesthesia, itself, may increase the risk of HAIs. Drugs used routinely during general anesthesia can impair the function of the ciliated epithelium. Opiates directly depress ciliary activity (40), atropine impairs mucociliary clearance by decreasing bronchial secretions and drying the mucous membranes (41,42), and dry anesthetic gases damage the ciliated cells and slow mucus flow (43, 44 and 45). In addition, high concentrations of oxygen cause an inflammatory response in the ciliated epithelium that leads to tissue sloughing (46).

The patients’ intrinsic risk of HAIs and the risk associated with surgical procedures may be increasing. For example, patients undergoing operations at this time are often older and have more underlying diseases than patients undergoing the same procedures a decade ago and, thus, may be at high risk of HAIs (47). In addition, new, more complex procedures have been introduced that may increase patients’ risk of infections more than older, less complex procedures. Moreover, surgical procedures and general anesthesia compromise the patient’s immune system by (a) breaching the skin and mucus membranes, the first lines of defense against infection; (b) impairing the patients’ immune response by exposure to general anesthetics; and (c) inducing a postsurgical inflammatory state (48). Furthermore, the anesthesia environment can become contaminated and some anesthesia equipment can create aerosols of infectious particles that contaminate equipment in the anesthesia work area, which subsequently can be a source of infectious agents for these vulnerable patients (49, 50, 51, 52 and 53).


Data Suggesting that the Practice of General Anesthesiology and Anesthesia Equipment Are not Source of Infection

Some investigators maintain that anesthesia machines, even when contaminated, do not transmit significant numbers of bacteria because (a) microorganisms are unlikely to survive in the hostile environment of the anesthesia machine due to desiccation by the flow of cold, dry anesthetic gases (54) and (b) the rubber and metal parts of the machine and the highly alkaline condensate at the bottom of the CO2 absorber inhibit growth of bacteria (55,56). The literature discussed below provides evidence in support of these hypotheses.

Colonized or Infected Patients Are not Likely to Contaminate the Anesthesia Machine Several studies suggest that patients colonized or infected with bacterial pathogens rarely contaminate the anesthesia machine (55,57,58). For example, Du Moulin and Saubermann (55) studied 15 patients anesthetized with sterile machines. Two throat and sputum cultures were obtained from each patient before general anesthesia was administered; 40% of the patients had cultures yielding more than 10 colonyforming units (CFU) of gram-negative bacteria and 60% had cultures that did not yield gram-negative bacteria. The investigators isolated 1 to 9 CFU per segment of the breathing circuit. However, all cultures from machines used on colonized patients were negative and only three cultures from machines used on patients without gram-negative colonization were positive. Similarly, Stemmermann and Stern (57) asked 14 patients with cavitary tuberculosis to breathe into a basal metabolic rate machine (which is similar to an anesthesia breathing circuit) for 10 minutes and then cough. The investigators did not identify Mycobacterium tuberculosis in smears or cultures of the saline used to wash the masks and tubing and, thus, concluded that the anesthesia circuit was unlikely to contribute significantly to bacterial
crosscontamination. These data suggest that colonized or infected patients rarely transmit bacterial pathogens via the breathing circuit to the anesthesia machine.

Contaminated Anesthesia Machines Are Unlikely to Transmit Bacterial Microorganisms to Patients Several investigators have used simulations to show that contaminated anesthesia machines are unlikely to transmit bacterial pathogens (55,59, 60, 61 and 62). For example, Adriani and Rovenstine (59) were unable to grow microorganisms from air blown through soda lime canisters contaminated with large numbers of E. coli or M. tuberculosis. Ziegler and Jacoby (60) used a contaminated machine to ventilate a sterile reservoir bag for 30 minutes; cultures of the reservoir bag remained negative. After inoculating the expiratory port of a sterile circle system with 108 to 109 CFU of either Enterobacter cloacae or Flavobacterium species, du Moulin and Saubermann (55) blew 3 L of nitrous oxide and oxygen per minute through the valve for 3 hours. Every 30 minutes, they obtained samples from the valve and found progressively fewer bacteria in the cultures. They did not recover the indicator microorganisms from other parts of the machine. Ibrahim and Perceval (62) seeded cleaned circuits with viridans streptococci or staphylococcal bacteriophages, attached these circuits to machines, and blew air through them. Air sampling cultures obtained from the distal ends of the tubes were all negative.

Anesthesia circuits are not a major source of infections for surgical patients and bacterial filters are not an important preventive measure.

Two prospective clinical trials have been cited as evidence that anesthesia circuits are not a major source of infections for surgical patients. Garibaldi et al. (63) randomly assigned 257 patients to be anesthetized with disposable corrugated plastic circuits containing bacterial filters (0.22 µm) and 263 patients to be anesthetized with disposable corrugated plastic circuits without filters. The postoperative pneumonia rates for the two groups did not differ significantly, but the study was powered to detect a 50% difference in rates, which would be difficult to achieve with most interventions. Feeley et al. (64) found no difference in postoperative pneumonia rates between 138 patients anesthetized with sterile disposable circuits and 155 patients anesthetized using clean reusable circuits. However, the study had a power of only 17% to detect a 50% difference in rates.

Van Hassel et al. (65) reviewed 9 years of surveillance data and found lower respiratory tract infections in 5 of 2,300 (0.2%) patients undergoing operations under regional anesthesia and 31 of 23,500 (0.1%) patients undergoing general anesthesia with tubing that was cleaned only once a day (i.e., was shared by three to seven patients). They changed the soda lime every 3 days and they placed filters at the T pieces only when patients had suspected or overt respiratory tract infections, M. tuberculosis, or human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection. They concluded that “in our setting, patient factors are most important in the development of postoperative lower respiratory infections and that the role of bacterial filters as a preventive measure is negligible” (65).

In summary, the studies reviewed in this section suggest the following: (a) colonized or infected patients are not likely to contaminate the anesthesia machine; (b) the anesthesia machine does not serve as a significant reservoir for bacterial microorganisms; (c) anesthesia circuits are not a major source of infections for surgical patients and bacterial filters are not an important preventive measure.


Data Suggesting that the Practice of General Anesthesia, Anesthesia Equipment, the Operating Room Environment, Anesthetic Medications, and Anesthesia Personnel Are Associated with HAIs

Endotracheal Tube Studies in experimental animals indicate that endotracheal tubes disrupt the ciliated tracheal epithelium, cause an inflammatory response, and impair mucociliary clearance, increasing the risk of subsequent infections (66, 67, 68, 69, 70 and 71). In addition, the endotracheal tube can serve as a route by which bacterial pathogens from the patient’s oropharynx, healthcare providers’ hands, and the surrounding environment can be transmitted into a patient’s trachea (72,73). Indeed, several studies have shown that gram-negative bacteria or other potential bacterial pathogens that were not identified by preoperative cultures of the nasopharynx, pharynx, or larynx subsequently contaminated endotracheal tubes in the postoperative period (72, 73 and 74). In addition, nasal-tracheal intubation has been shown to cause transient bacteremia (75,76). Thus, placement of endotracheal tubes can increase the risk of transmitting bacterial pathogens to patients and can contaminate a patient’s lungs with his or her own flora, thereby increasing the risk of HAIs.

Anesthesia machine and circuit (Ambu bag, breathing circuit tubing, Y connector, inspiratory and expiratory valves, CO2 absorber): Numerous authors cite an outbreak of follicular tonsillitis (77) and two outbreaks caused by Pseudomonas aeruginosa (78,79) as evidence that contaminated anesthesia machines transmit microorganisms. These reports provide some evidence that anesthesia equipment (anesthesia machine, Ambu bag, and circuit) could be reservoirs for bacterial pathogens and may play a role in bacterial transmission. However, the results of these investigations should be interpreted with caution, because the authors did not conclusively identify the source of the infecting microorganisms. Furthermore, the typing methods evaluated phenotypic, not genotypic, characteristics that do not discriminate between strains and modern molecular typing methods.

Albrecht and Dryden (80) also evaluated whether sterilizing the breathing circuits and using a disposable absorber affected the rate of postoperative pneumonia. They retrospectively reviewed the medical records of 220 randomly selected patients who underwent major abdominal operations requiring general anesthesia and who were not infected at the time of the operation. Twenty percent (10/50) of patients who underwent operations before the anesthesia equipment was sterilized, 26% (13/50) of patients who underwent operations when breathing circuits were sterilized but the absorbers were reused, and 6% (7/120) of patients who underwent operations after sterile breathing circuits and disposable absorbers were used acquired postoperative pneumonia. The investigators concluded that contaminated anesthesia machines transmitted bacteria to patients and they should, therefore, be
sterilized between cases. However, the results of this study should be interpreted with caution, because it was an unblinded, uncontrolled retrospective study and because the investigators did not specify their definition of postoperative pneumonia.

Other investigators have evaluated the ability of microorganisms to survive on anesthesia equipment. Investigators either obtained cultures from anesthesia equipment after routine use or conducted in vitro studies. In general, such experiments identified a wide variety of bacteria (saprophytic micrococci and bacilli, Staphylococcus aureus, coagulase-negative staphylococci, E. coli, P. aeruginosa, viridans streptococci, Bacillus species) contaminating all parts of used anesthesia machines (breathing circuits, rebreathing bags, inspiratory and expiratory valves) with the parts of the machine closest to the patient most heavily contaminated (78,81, 82, 83 and 84). For example, Meeks et al. (84) obtained cultures from anesthesia equipment after use. They grew Staphylococcus epidermidis from 73% of face masks, 12% of Y connectors, 6% of breathing circuits, and 6% of rebreathing bags; S. aureus from 10% of face masks and 1% of rebreathing tubes; and Pseudomonas species from 36% of face masks, 67% of Y connectors, 42% of breathing circuits, and 79% of rebreathing bags. In the study by Livingstone et al. (85), 33% (13/39) of the rubber masks used to anesthetize patients with tuberculosis yielded M. tuberculosis. Likewise, several investigators who obtained cultures from face masks used to administer nitrous oxide for dental procedures demonstrated that bacteria from a patient’s nose and mouth contaminated the apparatus (86, 87 and 88).

Investigators have also investigated the potential filtering and bactericidal roles of soda lime canisters and found that they do not filter bacterial microorganisms effectively (83,89,90). For example, Murphy et al. (89) aerosolized eight different bacterial species into a soda lime canister and found that up to 40% of the microorganisms were not retained in the canister. Investigators have also demonstrated that the soda lime in the canister is not uniformly bactericidal. Murphy et al. (89) found that, at room temperature, 1 gram of soda lime killed Klebsiella pneumoniae, Candida albicans, S. aureus, P. aeruginosa, Serratia marcescens, E. coli, and S. pneumoniae within 10 minutes, but 1% of the Bacillus subtilis CFU survived at 30 minutes. Dryden (83) demonstrated that 4% sodium hydroxide, Sodasorb extract, and Baralyme extract killed P. aeruginosa and Proteus mirabilis within 15 minutes, but M. tuberculosis survived for at least 3 hours in each of the solutions.

Investigators have also used laboratory models to simulate the patient-anesthesia machine interaction and concluded that air could move bacterial pathogens through the breathing circuit (83,90,91). For example, Nielsen et al. (91) measured the bacterial content of anesthetic gases before and after passing them through clean and previously used breathing systems to determine whether anesthetic gases could become contaminated when blown through contaminated circuits. Gases passed through clean circuits contained 1.2 to 50.2 (median 4.2) CFU of bacteria per 100 L, compared with 3.3 to 129.8 (median 38.5) CFU of bacteria per 100 L for gas passed through used circuits (Mann-Whitney p < .01). The authors concluded that anesthetic gases can transfer microorganisms.

Investigators have also attempted to assess the origin of breathing circuit contamination. Rathgeber et al. (92) obtained cultures of breathing circuits used with filters and from those used without filters to assess the origin of microbiologic contamination. When a filter was used, the microorganisms isolated from the breathing circuits were different than the microorganisms detected in the patients’ tracheal aspirates. When filters were not used, the same microorganisms were isolated from the patients’ tracheal aspirates and from the tubing in 13% of the cases. Thus, the study results demonstrated that patients’ bacterial microorganisms can contaminate the breathing circuits and that filters can prevent circuit contamination. However, the investigators were unable to show that filter use changed patient outcomes, because patients were not followed prospectively to determine whether they acquired postoperative pneumonia.

Investigators from the New South Wales (NSW) Health Department studied the potential role of anesthetic equipment in intraoperative viral transmission when they evaluated a cluster of patients who acquired hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection after having operative procedures at a private hospital in Sydney (93). After two persons who had operations on the same day presented to the hospital with acute hepatitis C, NSW health officials tested all patients who had operative procedures during the same session. Three more patients were found to be anti-HCV positive. Surgical personnel were tested and were anti-HCV negative. Patient-to-patient transmission was likely, because all five patients were infected with hepatitis C of the same genotype. The common denominator between patients seemed to be the anesthesia equipment; the same anesthesia circuit was used without a filter and without decontamination for all 11 patients who had procedures during the implicated session. On the basis of these data, the investigators concluded that the HCV was transmitted through a contaminated anesthesia circuit. They hypothesized that the index case’s respiratory secretions containing HCV were introduced into the anesthesia circuit and that the virus was transmitted in droplets through minor breaks in the oropharyngeal mucosa of subsequent patients. In response, NSW health officials recommended enforcing existing guidelines that a filter be used in the anesthesia circuit to prevent cross-transmission (18,19,94).

A number of other agencies, including the AANA (8), the Blood-borne Viruses Advisory Panel of the Association of Anaesthetists of Great Britain and Ireland (22), the Department of Health of the Netherlands Committee on Infection Prevention (23), and the Societé Francaise d’Anesthesie et Reanimation (24), have recommended that an appropriate filter be placed between the patient and the breathing system and that either a new filter or a new breathing circuit should be used for each patient. At present, there is no consensus on whether hydrophobic pleated membrane filters are necessary or whether electrostatic filters are adequate. Most studies of filtration efficiency have indicated that the hydrophobic filters are more efficient (95, 96 and 97). However, a study of patients undergoing general anesthesia found no difference between hydrophobic filters and electrostatic filters (98). Both filter types significantly decreased the incidence of bacterial contamination in the breathing circuits compared with the level of contamination in endotracheal tubes.


Laryngoscopes Inadequate disinfection of laryngoscope blades and handles has been associated with clusters of infection (99,100). These clusters are discussed further in the section “Current Infection Prevention and Control Guidelines and Current Anesthesia Practice.”

Equipment in the Anesthesia Work Area Loftus et al. (101,102) and Koff et al. (103) have documented that various pieces of equipment in the anesthesia work area are contaminated with bacterial pathogens. Other investigators have found extensive blood contamination in the anesthesia work area (104). These findings are discussed further in the section “Exposure of Anesthesia Personnel to Patients’ Blood and Body Fluids.”

Air Air in operating rooms can become contaminated with bacteria. For example, Edmiston et al. (105) obtained air samples from a single operating room during 70 different vascular procedures. S. aureus and various coagulasenegative staphylococcal species were recovered from 64% and 86% of all samples, respectively. Gram-negative bacteria were recovered less frequently (33%). The magnitude of contamination increased with proximity to the surgical field. Some of the microorganisms were identical to those recovered from HCWs’ nares, suggesting that the surgical masks were inefficient (105).

Medications In addition to impairing host defenses, anesthetic medications can become contaminated with viral or bacterial pathogens, which can then be injected directly into the patient’s intravascular space (106, 107, 108, 109 and 110). This has occurred when syringes become contaminated during use, when anesthesia personnel contaminate anesthetic medications either by contaminating multidose vials or by handling medications, such as propofol, improperly (106, 107, 108, 109, 110 and 111). The role of contaminated medications is discussed further in the sections “Infections Associated with Intravenous Anesthesia and Outbreaks Associated with Anesthesia Personnel.”

Anesthesia Providers Anesthesia providers can be colonized or infected with pathogens that can be transmitted to patients (112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118 and 119). In addition, anesthesia providers’ hands are often contaminated with pathogenic bacteria during all phases of anesthesia: induction, maintenance, and emergence (120,121). The role of microorganisms colonizing or infecting anesthesia providers and microorganisms carried on anesthesia providers’ hands is discussed further in the sections “Infections Associated with Intravenous Anesthesia and Outbreaks Associated with Anesthesia Personnel.”

In summary, the studies reviewed in this section suggest that (a) Bacteria can contaminate all parts of anesthesia circuits, but the highest numbers of bacteria contaminate the parts closest to the patient; (b) Anesthetic gases may carry bacteria from the machine to the patient or vice versa; (c) The soda lime removes bacteria imperfectly and, although it kills many bacterial pathogens, M. tuberculosis and Bacillus species survive prolonged exposure; (d) Filters decrease contamination of breathing circuits; (e) Anesthesia equipment such as endotracheal tubes, the anesthesia machine, laryngoscope handles/blades, syringes, and medications can serve as reservoirs for bacterial pathogens and may facilitate transmission to patients.

Thus, there are several ways that anesthesia practice could facilitate transmission of bacteria to patients during surgical procedures (49, 50, 51, 52 and 53). Given that surgical patients often have multiple comorbidities (47) and that numerous host defenses are breached or impaired by the surgical incision and by general anesthesia, patients may be particularly susceptible to microorganisms transmitted in the operating room (48). This hypothesis is supported by the results of a prospective, observational study by Hajjar and Girard (122). They found an incidence of 3.4 HAIs per 1,000 patients during the first 72 hours after the operations, suggesting that the source of the infections may have been in the operating room (122). However, the investigators could not directly link the practice of anesthesia or anesthesia equipment to intraoperative transmission of bacterial pathogens to patients. Consequently, many anesthesia providers do not believe that anesthetic practice or the anesthesia work area is associated with HAIs (123). In fact, the studies reviewed thus far provide little objective evidence linking either the practice of anesthesia or anesthesia equipment with direct transmission of bacterial microorganisms to patients.

Recently, Loftus et al. (101) developed and validated a method for assessing intraoperative bacterial transmission to the anesthesia work area and to the stopcocks on the patients’ intravenous catheters. These investigators randomly selected 61 operating rooms and decontaminated the adjustable pressure-limiting (APL) valve complex and the agent dial (AD) before the first case of the day. After the case, they cultured the APL valves, the ADs, and the stopcock sets. The number of CFU per surface area sampled (CPSS) on the APL valves and the ADs increased significantly, and 32% (95% confidence interval [95% CI] 20.6-44.9%) of the stopcock sets became contaminated. Most of the contaminating bacteria were skin microorganisms, but these microorganisms can cause bloodstream infections. In addition, methicillin-resistant S. aureus (MRSA) was transferred to the APL valves for two patients; the stopcock set became contaminated with E. cloacae for one of these patients. VRE was transmitted to all three sites for one patient and pulsed-field gel electrophoresis documented that all three sites were contaminated by the same strain. Moreover, the probability that the stopcock set would become contaminated increased as the CPSS increased, even after adjusting for the CPSS at baseline and for covariates (odds ratio [OR] 1.67; 95% CI 1.10-2.53; p = .02).

Subsequently, these investigators extended their observations by assessing transmission of bacteria in 82 pairs of patients (i.e., the first and second cases done in 82 randomly selected operating rooms during the study days) (102). The investigators also cultured the dominant hands of the anesthesia providers before they touched the patients. The investigators used biotyping to determine whether microorganisms cultured from the anesthesia work area (i.e., APL valves and ADs) and from the anesthesia providers’ hands were the same. Loftus et al. found that 11.5% of the stopcocks became contaminated, of which 47% were contaminated with isolates found on the anesthesia providers’ hands. They identified intraoperative transmission to the anesthesia work area in 89% of the cases and 12% of these work areas were contaminated with isolates from the providers’ hands. In one instance, they found
the same microorganism on the hands of the anesthesia provider before the start of the first case, on the stopcock at the end of the first case, on the anesthesia machine at the start of the second case, and on the stopcock and the machine at the end of the second case, suggesting that the anesthesia provider did not perform adequate hand hygiene and that the machine was not cleaned adequately between cases. Most transmission events involved coagulase-negative staphylococci (n = 8), or Micrococcus spp. (n = 5), but a Streptococcus spp. (n = 1), methicillin-susceptible S. aureus (n = 1), MRSA (n = 1), and Pseudomonas spp. (n = 2) were also transmitted. Given their methodology, the investigators felt that these percentages were minimal estimates of the actual transmission rates from the anesthesia providers’ hands. Furthermore, they found that the number of rooms that attending anesthesiologists supervised simultaneously was an independent predictor of transmission events that could not be linked to providers, suggesting that the attending physicians may have transmitted microorganisms from one patient to another. The investigators also found that patients discharged from the operating room to an intensive care unit (ICU) had a higher incidence of transmission events that could not be linked to providers, suggesting that anesthesia providers may have omitted hand hygiene, because they thought they needed to expedite care for more seriously ill patients. Again, given the limitations of their methods, the investigators felt that their results represented a minimum estimate of the transmission events.

Koff et al. (103) extended this model further when they did an intervention to see whether increasing hand hygiene decreased environmental contamination. They significantly increased (27-fold; p < .002) hand hygiene adherence over the baseline rate by giving anesthesia providers dispensers for alcohol-based hand rub that could be attached to their clothing. In addition, they noted that contamination of the anesthesia work area and stopcocks decreased from 32.8% to 7.5% (OR 0.17; 95% CI 0.06-0.51; p < .01) and that the incidence of HAIs decreased from 17.2% to 3.8% (OR 0.19; 95% CI 0.00-0.81; p = .02).

Conclusions Regarding the Role of the Practice of General Anesthesiology and Anesthesia Equipment as Potential Sources of Infection Until recently, the clinical importance of microorganisms isolated from anesthesia machines and their role in postoperative infections had not been clearly defined. In fact, Hogarth (124) concluded following a thorough review of the available literature that there was little evidence to implicate anesthesia machines and breathing systems as either a source of pathogenic bacteria or a vector for transmitting these microorganisms to patients undergoing general anesthesia for surgical procedures. Even the outbreaks reported by Joseph (77), Tinne et al. (78), and Olds et al. (79), and the report by Chant et al. (93) provide little evidence for transmission of pathogens by anesthesia machines or equipment, because these studies did not use sensitive methods for identifying specific strains and because they did not address whether anesthesia providers complied with critical infection prevention and control practices, such as performing hand hygiene, changing gloves between procedures on the same patient, changing gloves between patients, and cleaning and disinfecting the anesthesia cart and equipment between cases (125). Furthermore, most investigators assessing the role of the anesthetic equipment and staff in the transmission of microorganisms used simulations and did not assess real-life anesthetic procedures in operating rooms. Thus, prior studies do not allow us to determine whether the providers, the patients, or the anesthesia equipment was the source of the infecting microorganisms.

The studies by Loftus et al. (101,102) and Koff et al. (103) were the first to demonstrate that anesthesia environment and anesthesia providers do transmit bacteria to patients and to document that increasing hand hygiene decreases transmission of bacteria to the anesthesia work area and to stopcocks on patients’ intravenous catheters. In addition, their work suggests that transmission of microorganisms in the operating room may not be benign in that the mortality rate was higher for patients whose stopcocks became contaminated (101) and HAI rates were higher in the preintervention period when hand hygiene was poor and environmental contamination was high (102). While their studies did not prove the direct link between poor hand hygiene in the operating room and poor patient outcomes, these studies describe a method that other investigators can use to further this work and they provide a rationale for implementing interventions. Moreover, anesthesia providers can incorporate these interventions easily into their work flow to improve hand hygiene.

Preventing Infections Associated with General Anesthesia Procedures Current recommendations for measures for preventing intraoperative transmission of pathogenic microorganisms are relatively sparse (Table 60-1). We support changing and/or disinfecting breathing circuits and masks between operative cases (7,8). Because in-line circuit filters effectively prevent transfer of bacteria from the patient to the anesthesia machine and from the machine to the patient (126, 127 and 128), we think filters should also be used routinely, particularly for patients with active pulmonary tuberculosis receiving general anesthesia (29). Hand hygiene, cleaning, disinfection, and sterilization of equipment, and environmental cleaning are also important preventive measures. Further studies are needed to identify additional sources of pathogens in the operating room and additional risk factors for intraoperative transmission. Such studies could provide the evidence base for implementing intraoperative preventive measures.


INFECTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH INTRAVENOUS ANESTHESIA


Pathogenesis

Syringes Bacteria from the hands of healthcare workers can contaminate syringes and their contents. Blogg et al. (111) noted that 3 of 50 syringes (6%) used repeatedly in an operating room and 4 of 50 syringes (8%) used repeatedly in an ICU were contaminated with bacteria, including S. aureus (two syringes), E. coli (two syringes), S. epidermidis
(three syringes), and viridans streptococci (one syringe). Lessard et al. (51) also obtained cultures from syringes used in their operating rooms and found 4 contaminated syringes among 100 that were refilled an average of 3.58 times compared with 3 contaminated syringes among 100 filled only once. Blogg et al. (111) also tested whether bacteria (25 × 106 CFU of S. marcescens) on the hands could contaminate syringes when they were refilled. All 15 plastic syringes and 35 of 65 (54%) glass syringes were contaminated after they were refilled twice.













TABLE 60-1 Recommendations/Guidelines for Infection Control in Anesthesia Equipment















































































Item


ASA (7)


AANA (8)


ANZCA (18)


AORN (10, 11, 12 and 13)


CDC (28)


Other


Critical: Items that enter or contact an area that is normally sterile.


Examples include, but are not limited to vascular needles, catheters and tubing; syringes; stopcocks; regional block needles and catheters; and urinary catheters.


Use sterile equipment to enter or contact any body area that is normally sterile.


Clean reusable items thoroughly and sterilize before reuse. Ensure sterility at the time of use. Follow aseptic techniques when handling and using sterile equipment.


Use sterile items to enter sterile body area or vascular system.



Use sterile items to enter sterile tissue or the vascular system.


Clean items thoroughly before disinfection.


Sterilize medical devices or patientcare equipment before use.


Clean all items thoroughly before sterilizing or disinfecting.


Semicritical: Items that come in contact with mucous membranes.


Examples include but are not limited to laryngoscope blades, Magill forceps, endotracheal tube stylets, temperature probes, masks, breathing circuits and connectors, nasal and oral airways, selfinflating resuscitation bags, and esophageal stethoscopes.


Rinse items as soon as possible after use, decontaminate by cleaning and sterilize or treat with highlevel disinfection.


Keep endotracheal and endobronchial tubes free from contamination until they are used.


Sterilize items or treat with highlevel disinfection.


Endotracheal tubes, nasal, and pharyngeal airways should be kept sterile until they are used.


Reusable face masks must be thoroughly decontaminated and then disinfected before they are reused.


Items placed in the upper airway that may cause bleeding, such as laryngoscope blades and temperature probes, must be disinfected before use.


The breathing circuit should be sterilized or decontaminated and disinfected or protected by a new filter. When a filter is used the disposable items between the patient and the filter should be disposed of between each case and the reusable devices should be decontaminated and disinfected before they are reused.


Ventilator circuits should be cleaned and disinfected regularly.


Reusable anesthesia equipment that comes in contact with mucous membranes, blood, or body fluid is considered semicritical and should be cleaned and then processed by high-level disinfection, pasteurization, or sterilization between each patient use.


Sterilize or at minimum treat items with high-level disinfection.


Separate used laryngoscopes and nondisposable items that are overtly contaminated from clean equipment (374).


The part of the breathing circuit between the patient and the filter must either be discarded or cleaned and disinfected after each patient. If a carbon dioxide absorber is also used, the part of the breathing circuit between the absorber and the filter must either be discarded or cleaned and disinfected at the end of each procedure list. If carbon dioxide absorbers are not used, the breathing circuit tubing that conducts the gas to and from the filter must either be discarded or cleaned and disinfected at the end of each procedure or operation list. If a filter is not used, the breathing circuit must either be discarded or cleaned and disinfected after each patient. All anesthetic apparatus that comes in contact with a patient or becomes contaminated with blood or body substances for example airways, endotracheal tubes, laryngoscopes, suckers, forceps, temperature probes, esophageal echo probes and face masks must be either discarded or cleaned and disinfected after each patient (21).


A new filter should be placed between the patient and the breathing system OR a new breathing system should be used for each patient. Expired gas sampling should be done on


The breathing system side of the filter. Filters should not be used for pediatric anesthesia; new breathing systems should be used (22).


Noncritical: Items that touch intact skin or do not make contact with the patient.


Items that touch the patient.


Examples include, but are not limited to blood pressure cuffs, electrocardiograph cables and electrodes, pulse oximeter and skin temperature sensors, stethoscopes, and headstraps.


Clean equipment with a disinfectant at the end of the day and whenever visibly contaminated.


Process equipment with intermediate or low-level disinfection.


Laryngoscope handles should be decontaminated between uses.


Clean and decontaminate items when contaminated or visibly soiled and at the end of the day.


Wash items with detergent or disinfectant, rinse, and dry.


Items that do not touch the patient.


Examples include, but are not limited to exterior surfaces of anesthesia machines, carts, monitors, and tables.


Clean horizontal surfaces of anesthesia machines and carts after each patient.


Clean environmental surfaces with warm water and detergent or with a low low-to intermediatelevel disinfectant after each patient procedure; terminally disinfect at the end of the day or when contaminated with blood or body fluids.



Clean and decontaminate items when contaminated or visibly soiled and at the end of the day.


Single-use items


Reuse is not recommended because there are insufficient data on the safety of this practice for anesthesia equipment. Reuse of single-use items shifts the responsibility/liability from the manufacturer to the user. If single-use items are reprocessed, the users must develop a quality assessment program to ensure disinfection/sterilization is adequate and that the function and integrity are not compromised.


Do not reuse, clean, repackage, or resterilize disposable equipment designed for one-time use and labeled as “singleuse” items. Hospitals that reprocess and reuse such products, not the manufacturer, are responsible for their safety and effectiveness. Refer to Food and Drug Administration (FDA) guideline.


Disposable products that have been opened but not used or manipulated may be resterilized if the manufacturer approves the process.


Items of airway equipment to be placed in direct contact with the respiratory tract and airways labeled by the manufacturer as disposable or for single use only should not be reused.


Single-use items (e.g., suction catheters, breathing circuits, endotracheal tubes, stylets) should be used once and discarded.


(a) If a device cannot be cleaned, it cannot be reprocessed and reused; (b) if sterility of a postprocessed device cannot be demonstrated, the device cannot be reprocessed and reused;


(c) if the integrity and functionality of a reprocessed device cannot be demonstrated and documented to be as safe for patient care and/or equal to the original device specifications, the device cannot be reprocessed and reused. For further details the reader is referred to the AORN Guidance Statement: Reuse of Single-Use Devices (11)


Do not reprocess items or devices that cannot be cleaned and sterilized or disinfected without altering their physical integrity and function.


FDA compliance policy guide:


“…the institution or practitioner who reuses a disposable medical device should be able to demonstrate: (a) that the device can be adequately cleaned and sterilized, (b) that the physical characteristics or quality of the device will not be adversely affected, and (c) that the device remains safe and effective for its intended use. [A]ny institution or practitioner who resterilizes and/or reuses a disposable medical device must bear full responsibility for the performance, its safety and effectiveness” (375).


Medical and Surgical Products Liaison Group and the Association of British Health-Care Industries advise against re-use unless specifically permitted by manufacturers (376)


The New South Wales Health Department recommends that medical devices marked “single use only” should not be reused unless


(a) testing documents that the devices are not physically or microbiologically less safe than new items;


(b) reprocessing is controlled and in accordance with Good Manufacturing Processes defined by the Commonwealth Therapeutic Goods Administration;


(c) reprocessing must be in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions;


(d)standard information is needed for informed patient consent (21).


Valves and CO2 absorber


Clean and disinfect unidirectional valves and CO2 absorber chambers periodically.


Disassemble, clean, and sterilize CO2 valves prior to reuse.


When a patient has a respiratory infection, use disposable devices (e.g., circle system and absorber with bacterial filter, laryngoscope, and airway products) whenever possible.


When a filter is used in the circuit, sterilization of the carbon dioxide absorber before every case is not necessary. The device including the unidirectional valve should be disinfected regularly.


Absorbers and valves should be cleaned when the soda lime is changed according to the manufacturer’s written instructions. Particular attention should be paid to the valves. Routine sterilization or high-level disinfection of the internal components of anesthesia machines is considered unnecessary.


Bellows


Clean and disinfect tubing and bellows at regular intervals, not after each use. Routine sterilization/disinfection of the interior of anesthesia machines is not necessary or feasible.


Sterilize the anesthesia bellows and the bellows base or head after every case unless bacterial filters are used to protect the inspiratory, expiratory, and ventilator limbs of the circuit. When using disposable breathing circuits without bacterial filters, replace the ventilator bellows each time the circuit is replaced and the bellows base or head cleaned and sterilized.


Clean and disinfect regularly.


Bellows should be cleaned regularly according to the manufacturer’s written instructions.


Bellows are thought to represent a low risk for transmission of infection and do not require cleaning and disinfection after each use.


Filters for breathing circuits


There are insufficient outcome data to support routine use of bacterial filters.


Use a filter for patients known or suspected to have active tuberculosis.


Use breathing circuits with bacterial filters for all cases.




Data do not support using bacterial filters to prevent nosocomial pulmonary infections (32).


Use filter if patient has suspected or confirmed active tuberculosis (29).


If used, filters must be discarded after each patient (26).


At the current state of knowledge, a new bacterial/viral filter should be used for each case. The filter should be placed so as to protect the breathing circuit from possible contamination by the patient (23).


Heated humidifiers



Clean and sterilize humidifiers after each use. Use sterile water.




Sterilize reusable humidifiers or subject them to high-level disinfection after each use (32).



ASA, American Society of Anesthesiologists; AANA, American Association of Nurse Anesthetists; ANZCA, Australia and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists; AORN, Association of PeriOperative Registered Nurses; CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention



To simulate the common syringe technique, several investigators injected liquid from tuberculin syringes through 26-gauge needles into suspensions of E. coli (129, 130 and 131), S. aureus (131), poliovirus (132), or 3H-thymide (131). After removing the needles, they examined the syringe contents and found that most were contaminated. Plott et al. (133) took this line of research one step further. They placed 10 mL of sterile water containing 106 plaqueforming units of vesicular stomatitis virus into a multidose vial. They then injected 1 mL of sterile water into the vial, withdrew the syringe, changed the needle, drew 1 mL of air into the syringe, injected the air into a second vial, and withdrew 1 mL of water. All of the second vials were contaminated with vesicular stomatitis virus.

Syringes can become contaminated with a patient’s blood or with blood-borne pathogens after just one injection into a patient or into an intravenous line. Fleming and Ogilvie (134) found blood in 5 of 50 syringes (10%) used to inject a vaccine subcutaneously, and Hughes (135) identified red blood cells in 17 of 39 syringes (44%) used to inject saline intramuscularly. Hughes demonstrated that fluid was aspirated from the needle into the syringe when the needle was removed from the syringe. He hypothesized that the syringe used to administer penicillin was contaminated in this manner and subsequently transmitted serum hepatitis to 26 patients. Other investigators confirmed Hughes’s hypothesis (129,136). For example, Lutz et al. (129) calculated that 2 × 10-5 mL of fluid were aspirated into the syringe when they removed the needle. Although minuscule, this volume of blood is 200 to 2,000 times greater than the amount required to transmit hepatitis B virus to chimpanzees (137).

Syringe contents may be contaminated with blood when the syringes are used to administer fluids into intravenous lines. Hein et al. (138) detected visible blood in 6 and occult blood in 8 of 100 injection ports for intravenous tubing. Similarly, Trepanier et al. (139) used Ames Multistix read by a Clinitek 200 module (sensitive to a 1:32,000 dilution) to detect blood in intravenous fluids withdrawn through injection ports. They detected blood in 3.33% (95% CI 2.26-4.73%) of samples withdrawn from the first port and in 0.3% (95% CI 0.01-1.84%) of those withdrawn from the third port. When they injected fluids into intravenous tubing through which blood was infusing, 34% (95% CI 24.8-44.1%) of the syringes were contaminated. Using 10-mL syringes, Parlow (140) injected 2-mL aliquots of normal saline into injection ports of intravenous lines used for patients undergoing general anesthesia. After injecting four aliquots per syringe, the investigator removed the needle, filtered the remaining 2 mL of saline, and stained the filter with Papanicolaou’s stain. Three of 26 samples (11.5%) contained red blood cells.

Multidose Vials Many drugs used by anesthesia personnel are packaged in multidose vials. Ninety-eight percent of anesthesia personnel surveyed by Kempen used multidose vials opened by unknown persons, and 75% refilled common syringes from multidose vials and did not subsequently discard the vial (141,142). Moreover, a study by Zacher et al. (143) suggests that bacteria contaminating the outside of a multidose vial can be injected into the vial if the vial is not disinfected.

Corley et al. (144) injected at least one billion S. aureus or E. coli microorganisms into vials containing succinylcholine chloride, chloroprocaine, tubocurarine, water for injection, and sodium chloride for injection. After 7 days, 99.6% to 100% of the microorganisms were killed. Of the three anesthetic agents tested, only succinylcholine chloride did not kill all of the bacteria. Highsmith et al. (145) evaluated whether 12 different pathogens persisted in eight drugs commonly packaged in multidose vials. Cultures of procainamide and methohexital were negative at 24 hours. Succinylcholine chloride, regular insulin, potassium chloride, and thiopental killed slowly or allowed limited survival of several microorganisms. If the bacteria were washed in 0.25% peptone broth (i.e., carried some nutrients with them when injected), all 12 microorganisms survived or proliferated in lidocaine. However, if the bacteria were washed in saline, lidocaine supported growth of only Pseudomonas cepacia. Bawden et al. (146) inoculated 1 to 100 CFU of E. coli or P. aeruginosa into 30-mL multidose vials of bacteriostatic water with 0.9% benzyl alcohol, 0.9% sodium chloride with 0.9% benzyl alcohol, and 1% lidocaine hydrochloride with 1 mg/ml of methylparaben. All cultures were positive at 1 hour, and E. coli was recovered from the lidocaine at 16 hours. Longfield et al. (147) inoculated 11 commonly used medications with suspensions of 10 bacterial species. When stored at 22°C, atropine and D-tubocurarine were sterile at 4 hours, but lidocaine and heparin still contained viable bacteria at 24 hours. At 4°C, bacteria persisted longer in all medications tested. Plott et al. (133) injected 106 plaque-forming units of vesicular stomatitis virus into sterile water, 1% lidocaine, and 1% lidocaine with 1:100,000 epinephrine. All cultures were positive at 1 hour and cultures of the sterile water and the lidocaine were positive at 1 day. None of the vials contained viable virus at 1 week.

The results of multiple culture surveys indicate that the proportion of multidose vials contaminated by bacteria has ranged from 0% to 27% (144,146,148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154 and 155). In their review of 12 studies published between 1958 and 1983, Longfield et al. (152) noted that the studies reporting high rates were done before 1973. On the basis of four studies done after 1973, they estimated that 0.6% of used multidose vials were contaminated with bacteria. Longfield et al. suggested that the differences between the results of earlier and more recent studies might be explained by changes in both the types of drugs packaged in multidose vials and the chemicals used as preservatives. After reviewing 15 papers published between 1958 and 1986, Thompson et al. (156) estimated that 0.5% of used multidose vials become contaminated with bacteria.

Of the studies we evaluated, only one tested used multidose vials for viral contamination. Petty et al. (148) tested 121 used multidose vials for viruses, none of which were
positive. Only two studies evaluated used multidose vials for red blood cells. Melnyk et al. (151) evaluated 69 multidose vials; none of the vials were contaminated with bacteria, but one (1.4%) contained red blood cells. Arrington et al. (157) noted that many anesthesia staff members withdrew contents from a medication vial, injected the drug into intravenous tubing, and then used the same needle and syringe to withdraw medication for the next patient. Because they were concerned that this practice could contaminate medication vials, the authors tested vials at the end of the day for the presence of occult blood. The first group consisted of vials reused by staff members who used a single needle and syringe as described above. The second group consisted of vials used by the investigators who placed a new needle on the used syringe to withdraw medication from vials. Eleven of 492 (2.2%) vials in the first group and 1 of 369 (0.3%) in the second group contained occult blood. The authors concluded that their study supported the AANA (8) and CDC (30) guidelines that mandate use of a new needle and a new syringe for each patient and each time a vial is entered.


Epidemiology

A number of outbreaks have been caused by contaminated solutions or anesthetic agents (106, 107, 108, 109 and 110,158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170 and 171,172,173,174). Of the 21 reports reviewed in Table 60-2, 20 were caused by drugs that were contaminated at the healthcare facility and only one was caused by a drug contaminated by the manufacturer. Nine outbreaks were caused by contaminated propofol (106,108, 109 and 110,162,163,167,174). Bennett et al. (171) investigated outbreaks associated with propofol at seven hospitals and found numerous breaks in aseptic technique. For example, anesthesia personnel did not clean vials before opening them and did not wear gloves. They also drew up the drug before the case, transferred syringes containing unused drugs between operating rooms and facilities, and reused syringes. In one hospital, the same strain of S. aureus was isolated from the patients and from a lesion on the scalp of the anesthesiologist who prepared the medication (108). A case-control study implicated exposure to propofol as the risk factor, suggesting that the anesthesiologist contaminated the propofol solution. Kuehnert et al. (108) noted similar faulty technique. Anesthesia personnel often did not wash their hands before preparing the medications, drew up all the propofol doses required for an entire day at one time, and kept the syringes at room temperature throughout the day. In addition, they often used multidose vials that contained large volumes of propofol, and stored the unused doses in the open vial at room temperature.

Most anesthetic drugs are weak bases dissolved in acidic solutions that inhibit growth of bacteria and fungi (175, 176 and 177), and most contain a bacteriostatic agent. However, propofol is suspended in a lipid solution that supports bacterial and fungal growth (176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183 and 184), and it does not contain a preservative. If anesthesia personnel do not follow aseptic technique when they remove propofol from the glass vial, they can contaminate the solution. The contaminating microorganisms can multiply in propofol while it is infused slowly or while prefilled syringes sit at room temperature. To avoid such problems, the manufacturer recommends that propofol “be drawn into a sterile syringe immediately after the ampoule is opened and administration should commence promptly. Each unit of [propofol] is intended for use in a single patient and the syringe and any unused portion of [propofol] must be discarded at the end of the surgical procedure” (184,185).

Seeberger et al. (186) administer propofol using the following protocol. The anesthesiologist must (a) use only 20-mL ampoules of propofol; (b) use an alcohol-based hand rub before starting the procedure; (c) prepare the syringes, lines, and stopcocks just before the procedure; and (d) discard all unused propofol, and never use propofol from the same ampoule for more than one patient. In addition, an infection preventionist conducts continuing education, teaching anesthesia staff members about good infection prevention practice and monitoring their adherence. These investigators reported that between January 1, 1995, and June 30, 1996, they performed 1,407 anesthetic procedures using propofol and 5,026 using thiopentone. Subsequent follow-up revealed that the incidence of catheter-related sepsis of unknown origin was 0.2% for both groups and the incidence of superficial thrombophlebitis and of fever >38°C of unknown origin was <0.1% for both groups. On the basis of these data, they concluded that their precautions were adequate to prevent infections in patients undergoing intravenous anesthesia with propofol.

Other outbreaks reviewed in Table 60-2 illustrate how various breaks in aseptic technique, including narcotic pilfering (164) use of the same syringe for more than one patient (165,173), and assembling equipment in advance of the procedure (108,166), have led to infections. Although outbreaks associated with contaminated solutions or drugs occur rarely, large numbers of patients can be infected. Most of the reported outbreaks have been related directly to poor aseptic technique, including the unacceptable practices of administering the same solution to more than one patient and entering a single use (174) or a multidose vial (173) with a used syringe and needle. Of note, outbreaks of viral hepatitis (seven hepatitis C, four hepatitis B) still occur related to unacceptable practices—reuse of needles or syringes (either for more than one patient or for the same patient by entering a vial with used equipment and administering the remaining medication to other patients) (165,168,172,173,174) and misuse of multidose vials (107,109,169,170,173). Rather than saving money, these unacceptable practices actually increase the costs of medical care (due to the costs of investigating outbreaks and treating patients who become infected), harm patients, and destroy careers.


Preventing Infections Related to Intravenous Anesthesia

Table 60-3 summarizes the guidelines that anesthesia societies, government agencies, and others have developed regarding practices that will limit the risk of infection related to intravenous anesthesia. Given the information in the preceding section, we believe that very few infections would occur in association with intravenous anesthesia if anesthesia providers knew the guidelines and followed them.










TABLE 60-2 Outbreaks Related to Intravenous Anesthesia





















































































































































































Author (Reference)


Year


Contaminated Product


Infection


Number of Patients


Microorganism


Comments


Sack (158)


1970


Intravenous solution used for numerous patients


Bacteremia


5


K. pneumoniae, A. cloacae


Multiple-dose solution used by same anesthesiologist.


Siboni (159) Borghans (160)


1979


Fentanyl


Bacteremia


16


P. cepacia


Intrinsic contamination despite methyl- and propyl-phydroxybenzoates included as preservatives.


Maldonado (161)


1989


Lidocaine multidose vial


Hepatitis


5


Hepatitis B


Vial used for numerous patients by one anesthesiologist.


CDC (162) Daily (106)


1990


Propofol infused per pump


Fungemia, endophthalmitis


4


C. albicans


Breaks in aseptic technique noted in anesthesia practice.


CDC (162)


1990


Propofol infused per pump


Fever, hypertension


2


M. osloensis


Same infusion, syringe, and pump used for both patients.


CDC (162) Villarino (163)


1990


Propofol infused per pump


Bacteremia, surgical site infections


13


S. aureus


Same phage type isolated from the patients and the hands of the nurse anesthetist, same infusion used for numerous patients.


CDC (162)


1990


Propofol infused per pump


Fever, surgical site infections


8


S. aureus


Same phage type isolated from the patients and from the anesthesiologist’s throat.


Maki (164)


1991


Fentanyl in predrawn syringes


Bacteremia


3


P. pickettii


Narcotic tampering in pharmacy contaminated the medication.


Froggatt (165)


1991


Common syringe used on numerous patients


Hepatitis


6


Hepatitis B


Medication syringes contaminated by blood from a Hepatitis B carrier and used on subsequent patients.


Rudnick (166)


1991


Preassembled pressuremonitoring equipment


Bacteremia


9


P. aeruginosa, E. cloacae, K. pneumoniae


Pressure-monitoring equipment contaminated with floor-washing solution.


Veber (110)


1994


Propofol injections


Bacteremia


4


K. pneumoniae


Contents of one vial used for four patients over 18 h.


Kuehnert (108)


1997


Propofol injections


Bloodstream infection


5


S. aureus


Contents of one vial used on successive patients.


Kidd-Ljunggren (107)


1999


Local anesthetic injections


Hepatitis


2


Hepatitis B


A permanent aspiration needle was left in the bottle of local anesthetic. The desired amount was drawn into a syringe. If the patient needed more pain relief, the same syringe was used to obtain the agent. The multidose vial was NOT discarded between patients.


Henry (167)


2001


Propofol injections


Bloodstream infection (5)


Surgical site infection (2)


7


S. marcescens


One anesthesiologist was associated with all cases but only 14% of the controls. All cases received propofol compared with 24% of controls. No cultures of the environment or the anesthesiologist were positive for the etiologic agent.


Massari (109)


2001


Propofol


Hepatitis


4


Hepatitis C


Risk factors for infection included being operated on during the same morning session on the same day as the probable source patient. All five patients were infected with genotype 1b. A multidose vial of propofol was the shared by all five patients.


Meier (168)


2002


Sedative injections


Hepatitis


>50


Hepatitis C


Nurse anesthetist in a pain clinic used the same needle and syringe to give sedative injections into ports of intravenous lines.


Anonymous (169)


2002


Sedative injections


Hepatitis


28


Hepatitis C


Anesthesiologist in an endoscopy clinic obtained sedative from a multidose vial and gave several injections to the same patient with a single needle and syringe. The multidose vial was used for more than one patient. A patient with chronic hepatitis C, genotype 2C, underwent endoscopy at the beginning of the epidemic period.


Carbonne (170)


2003


Fentanyl injections


Hepatitis


2


Hepatitis C


A patient had chronic hepatitis C, subtype 1b. Repeat doses of fentanyl were obtained from a multidose vial with a used syringe and needle. Two patients whose operations followed this patient’s operation acquired hepatitis C of the same genotype.


Comstock (173)


2004


Three different sedation medications


Hepatitis


102


Hepatitis C


A nurse prepared one syringe and needle for each of three sedation medications for a single pain clinic session. She injected drugs through heparin locks and she believed these devices were sterile.


Germain (172)


2005


Fentanyl


Hepatitis


3


Hepatitis B and C


Same syringe and needle probably were used to give the source patient fentanyl from two different vials. Fentanyl vial 2 was used for the index case and for cases 2 and 3, but not for a patient who did not become infected. The fentanyl was injected directly into peripheral intravenous catheters without antireflux valves.


CDC (174)


2008


Propofol


Hepatitis


≥6; 40,000 involved in the recall


Hepatitis C


A clean needle and syringe were used to draw medication from a single-use vial of propofol, which was injected directly through an intravenous catheter. If a patient required more sedation, the needle was removed from the syringe and replaced with a new needle. The new needle and the used syringe were used to draw more propofol. Backflow from the patient’s intravenous catheter or when the needle was removed might have contaminated the syringe with HCV and subsequently contaminated the vial. Propofol remaining in the vial was used to sedate the next patient.


Note: Reference (171) describes a case-control study done at seven hospitals that had outbreaks related to misuse of propofol. Thus, references (106,162,163) share cases with reference (171).

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Jun 22, 2016 | Posted by in GENERAL & FAMILY MEDICINE | Comments Off on Healthcare-Associated Infections in Anesthesia

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