Universe is deterministic?
Yes
No
We possess
free will?
Yes
Compatibilism
(soft determinism)
Libertarianism
(Incompatibilism.1)
No
Hard determinism
(Incompatibilism.2)
Randoma
The view that “free will” and a deterministic universe can be brought together is known as “compatibilism” (or “soft determinism”, in order to distinguish it from “hard determinism”, discussed below). Compatibilism (see Sect. 1.3.1) is a view held widely both by individuals who have given the question of free will a lot of thought, and by those acting more instinctively to try and reconcile different aspects of their experience of being human.
If someone is not persuaded that free will and a deterministic universe are compatible then it follows that they are an “incompatibilist”. As is evident from Table 1.1, however, an incompatibilist position might be held for one of two divergent reasons. Firstly, if they contend that the strength of the case for free will rules out a deterministic universe (and/or the case for indeterminism is considered so overwhelming) then the person is a Libertarian4 (see Sect. 1.3.2). I have termed this Incompatibilism.1. Alternatively, the weight of evidence for a deterministic universe might be considered so strong (and/or the argument for free will so weak) that there is no room left for free will; this would be a “hard deterministic” viewpoint (or, as I have labelled it, Incompatibilism.2, see Sect. 1.3.3).
Since “the free will problem” remains one of the liveliest debates in contemporary philosophy, there have inevitably been many gallons of ink spilt on the topic. For each of these viewpoints (compatibilism, libertarianism, hard determinism) there are multiple nuanced positions, each substantiated (and rebutted) by a variety of closely-reasoned arguments. Within the constraints of the current book it will only be possible to paint descriptions of the major schools of thought on free will and determinism with relatively broad brush strokes, reserving finer detail for places where greater depth is necessary in consideration of the significance of current developments in genetics and neuroscience.
1.3.1 Compatibilism
As noted above, compatibilism has a long history and remains popular with philosophers. It seems to be the natural way to reconcile our apparent ability to decide between more than one possible action and the revelation, brought to the fore by Isaac Newton, that we live in a world governed by repeatable and predictable laws.
Free will is discussed more fully in the context of Libertarianism below (Sect. 1.3.2). In brief, however, we need to note here that free will has traditionally been seen as having two fundamental characteristics. Firstly, there was a requirement for two or more potential outcomes, with the capacity for the agent to choose between them. In other words there needed to be “alternative possibilities”, such that the agent “could have done otherwise”. As will be seen, this necessity has been brought into question during more recent discussions. Secondly, there must be an internal source for the decision; responsibility needed to be the agent’s choice, not an outcome imposed upon them by external forces (Kane 2011a).
At the risk of gross oversimplification, compatibilists can be divided into classical compatibilists (and their heirs, the conditionalist compatibilists) and new compatibilists (McKenna 2009). For classical compatibilists, who included Thomas Hobbes and David Hume amongst their number, reconciliation between determinism and freedom is achieved by invoking hypothetical or conditional alternative possibilities. This might be summarised in the view “nothing would have prevented you doing differently if you had chosen to do so, but you didn’t”.
More recently, philosophers have questioned whether the principle of alternate possibilities is necessary in determination of moral responsibility.5 In a seminal paper of 1969, Harry Frankfurt conducted thought experiments that drove a vital wedge between moral responsibility and the need for alternative possibilities (Frankfurt 1969). Supposing, Frankfurt argues, an agent (Jones) made a wilful decision to carry out a particular action. Before Jones acts, someone else intervenes coercing him into doing the very same act that Jones had already decided to do. When Jones subsequently follows through and carries out this action, is he morally responsible for so doing?
Frankfurt takes us further with a second thought experiment. Here Jones has to decide between Action A and Action B. In this second case, Jones is subject to the authority of a controller, Black. Black has the ability to influence Jones such that, whatever initial decision Jones makes, Black will ensure that his choice, Action B, is carried out by Jones. Jones may decide on his own to carry out Action B, in which case Black will do nothing. However, if Jones decides upon Action A, then Black will intervene to ensure that Jones does Action B instead. Frankfurt argues that if Jones decided independently to carry out Action B then he is morally responsible, even though he literally could not have done otherwise, since Black would have intervened.
These scenarios may seem contrived, but their logic remains robust and, in consequence, they provided the opportunity for schism between moral responsibility and the necessity for alternative possibilities. In subsequent years, many similar Frankfurt-type thought experiments have been conducted to support this overall position.
1.3.2 Libertarianism
A libertarian standpoint must, of necessity, establish positive evidence for the existence of free will, but it is required to do more than this. To be distinct from compatibilism (Sect. 1.3.1), it is also essential for libertarianism to deny determinism and/or to deny that determinism and free will are compatible. Furthermore, the model of free will that emerges from this process must fit in a coherent manner with an indeterministic world.
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