Description |
Cause(s) of Outbreak |
Corrective Measure(s) Recommended |
Reference |
Bacteremia, Fungemia, or Pyrogenic Reactions not Related to Dialyzer Reuse |
Pyrogenic reactions in 49 patients |
Untreated city water contained high levels of endotoxin |
Install a reverse osmosis system |
(4) |
Pyrogenic reactions in 45 patients |
Inadequate disinfection of the fluid distribution system |
Increase disinfection frequency and contact time of the disinfectant |
(55) |
Pyrogenic reactions in 14 patients; 2 bacteremia; 1 death |
Reverse osmosis water storage tank contaminated with bacteria |
Remove or properly maintain and disinfect the storage tank |
(35) |
Pyrogenic reactions in six patients; seven bacteremias |
Inadequate disinfection of water distribution system and dialysis machines; improper microbial assay procedure |
Use correct microbial assay procedures; disinfect water treatment system and dialysis machines following manufacturer’s recommended procedures |
(301) |
Bacteremia in 35 patients with central venous catheters (CVCs) |
CVCs used as facilities primary vascular access; median duration of infected catheters was 311 d; improper aseptic techniques |
Uses CVCs when only absolutely necessary for vascular access; use appropriate aseptic technique when inserting and performing routine catheter care |
(302) |
Three pyrogenic reactions and 10 bacteremias in patients treated on machines with a port for disposal of dialyzer priming fluid (waste-handling option or WHO port) |
Incompetent check valves allowing backflow of fluid from the waste side of the machine into attached blood tubing; bacterial contamination of the WHO |
Routine disinfection and maintenance of the dialysis machine including the WHO; check competency of WHO prior to patient treatment |
(103) |
Bacteremia in 10 patients treated on machines with WHO port |
Incompetent backflow to allow backflow from dialysate effluent side of the machine in the WHO port and attached bloodlines |
Routine maintenance, disinfection, and check for valve competence of the WHO port |
(104) |
Outbreak of pyrogenic reactions and gramnegative bacteremia in 11 patients |
Water distribution system and machines were not routinely disinfected according to manufacturer’s recommendations. Water and dialysate samples were cultured using a calibrated loop and blood agar plates—results were always as no growth |
Disinfect machines according to manufacturer’s recommendations and include reverse osmosis water distribution system in the weekly disinfection schedule; microbiological assay should be performed via membrane filtration or spread plate using Trypticase Soy agar |
(9) |
Phialemonium curvatum access infections in four dialysis patients; two of these patients died of systemic disease |
Observations at the facility noted some irregularities in site prep for needle insertion. All affected patients had synthetic grafts. One environmental sample was positive for P. curvatum (condensate pan of HVAC serving the unit) |
Review infection control practices and clean and disinfect HVAC system where water accumulated. Perform surveillance on all patients |
(303) |
Phialemonium curvatum blood stream infections in two patients |
Water system and dialysis machines with WHO ports not routinely maintained; water system contained dead legs and lab used wrong assays |
Conduct routine maintenance and disinfection of machines and WHO ports; redesign water system to eliminate dead legs; have a routine schedule for disinfection of the water system |
(105) |
Bacteremia/Pyrogenic Reactions Related to Dialyzer Reprocessing |
Mycobacterial infections in 27 patients |
Inadequate concentration of dialyzer disinfectant |
Increase formaldehyde concentration used to disinfect dialyzers to 4% |
(27) |
Mycobacterial infections in five high-flux dialysis patients; two deaths |
Inadequate concentration of dialyzer disinfectant and inadequate disinfection of water treatment system |
Use higher concentration of peracetic acid for reprocessing dialyzers and follow manufacturers labeled recommendations; Increase frequency of disinfecting the water treatment system |
(304) |
Bacteremia in six patients |
Inadequate concentration of dialyzer disinfectant; water used to reprocess dialyzers did not meet AAMI standards |
Use AAMI quality water; insure proper germicide concentration in the dialyzer |
CDC unpublished data |
Bacteremia and pyrogenic reactions in six patients |
Dialyzer disinfectant diluted to improper concentration |
Use disinfectant at the manufacturers’ recommended dilution and verify concentration |
(79) |
Bacteremia and pyrogenic reactions in six patients |
Inadequate mixing of dialyzer disinfectant |
Thoroughly mix disinfectant and verify proper concentration |
(10) |
Bacteremia in 33 patients at two dialysis centers |
Dialyzer disinfectant created holes in the dialyzer membrane |
Change disinfectant (product was withdrawn from the market place by the manufacturer) |
(305,306) |
Bacteremia in six patients; all blood isolates had similar plasmid profiles |
Dialyzers were contaminated during removal and cleaning of headers with gauze; staff not routinely changing gloves; dialyzers not reprocessed for several hours after disassembly and cleaning |
Do not use gauze or similar material to remove clots from header; change gloves frequently; process dialyzers after rinsing and cleaning |
(307) |
Pyrogenic reactions in three high-flux dialysis patients |
Dialyzer reprocessed with two disinfectants; water for reuse did not meet AAMI standards |
Do not disinfect dialyzers with multiple germicides; more frequent disinfection of water treatment system and conduct routine environmental monitoring of water for reuse |
(308) |
Pyrogenic reactions in 14 high-flux dialysis patients; one death |
Dialyzers rinsed with city (tap) water containing high levels of endotoxin; water used to reprocess dialyzers did not meet AAMI standards |
Do not rinse or reprocess dialyzers with tap water; use AAMI quality water for rinsing and preparing dialyzer disinfectant |
(309) |
Pyrogenic reactions in 18 patients |
Dialyzers rinsed with city (tap) water containing high levels of endotoxin; water used to reprocess dialyzers did not meet AAMI standards |
Do not rinse or reprocess dialyzers with tap water; Use AAMI quality water for rinsing and preparing dialyzer disinfectant |
(11) |
Pyrogenic reactions in 22 patients |
Water for reuse did not meet AAMI standards; improper microbiological technique was used on samples collected for monthly monitoring |
Use the recommended assay procedure for analysis of water and dialysate; disinfect water distribution system |
(8) |
Bacteremia and candidemia among patients in seven dialysis units (MN and CA) |
Dialyzers were not reprocessed in a timely manner; some dialyzers refrigerated for extended periods of time before reprocessing; Company recently made changes to header cleaning protocol |
Reprocess dialyzers as soon as possible; follow joint CDC and dialyzer reprocessing equipment and disinfectant manufacturer guidance for cleaning and disinfecting headers of dialyzer |
CDC unpublished data |
Transmission of Viral Agents |
26 patients seroconvert to HBsAg+ during a 10-mo period |
Leakage of coil dialyzer membranes and use of recirculating bath dialysis machines |
Separation of HBsAg+ patients and equipment from all other patients |
(181) |
19 patients and 1 staff member seroconvert to HBsAg+ during a 14-mo period |
No specific cause determined; falsepositive HBsAg results caused some susceptible patients to be dialyzed with infected patients |
Laboratory confirmation of HBsAg+ results; strict adherence to glove use and use of separate equipment for HBsAg+ patients |
(310) |
24 patients and 6 staff seroconverted to HBsAg+ during a 10-mo period |
Staff not wearing gloves; surfaces not properly disinfected; improper handling of needles/sharps resulting in many staff needlestick injuries |
Separation of HBsAg+ patients and equipment from susceptible patients; proper precautions by staff (e.g., gloves; handling of needles and sharps) |
(181) |
13 patients and 1 staff member seroconvert to HBsAg+ during a 1-mo period |
Extrinsic contamination of intravenous medication being prepared adjacent to an area where blood samples were handled |
Separate medication preparation area from area where blood processing for diagnostic tests is performed |
(186) |
Eight patients seroconverted to HBsAg+ during a 5-mo period |
Extrinsic contamination of multidose medication vial shared by HBsAg+ and HBV-susceptible patients |
No sharing of supplies, equipment, and medications between patients |
(CDC, unpublished data) |
Seven patients seroconverted to HBsAg+ during a 3-mo period |
Same staff caring for HBsAg+ and HBV-susceptible patients |
Separation of HBsAg+ patients from other patients; same staff should not care for HBsAg+ and HBV susceptible patients |
(181) |
Eight patients seroconverted to HBsAg+ during 1 mo |
Not consistently using external pressure transducer protectors; same staff members cared for both HBsAg+ patients and HBV-susceptible patients |
Use external pressure transducer protectors and replace after each use; same staff members should not care for HBV-infected and susceptible patients on the same shift |
(300) |
14 patients seroconvert to HBsAg+ during a 6-wk period |
Failure to review results of admission and monthly HBsAg testing; inconsistent hand washing and use of gloves; adjacent clean and contaminated areas; <20% of patients vaccinated |
Proper infection control precautions for dialysis facilities; routine review of serologic testing; hepatitis B vaccination of all patients |
(184) |
Seven patients on the same shift seroconvert to HBsAg+ during a 2-mo period |
Same staff members cared for HBsAg+ and HBV-susceptible patients on the same shift; common medication and supply carts were moved between stations, and multidose vials were shared; no patients vaccinated |
Dedicated staff for HBsAg+ patients; no sharing of equipment or supplies between any patients; centralized medication and supply areas; hepatitis B vaccination of all patients |
(184) |
Four patients seroconverted to HBsAg+ during a 3-mo period |
Transmission appeared to occur during hospitalization at an acute-care facility; no patients vaccinated |
Hepatitis B vaccination of all patients |
(184) |
11 patients seroconverted to HBsAg+ during a 3-mo period |
Staff, equipment, and supplies were shared between HBsAg+ and HBV-susceptible patients; no patients were vaccinated |
Dedicated staff for HBsAg+; no sharing of medication or supplies between any patients; hepatitis B vaccination of all patients |
(184) |
Two patients converted to HBsAg+ during a 4-mo period |
Same staff cared for HBsAg+ and HBV-susceptible patients; no patients vaccinated |
Hepatitis B vaccination of all patients; dedicate staff for the care of HBsAg+ patients; no sharing of supplies or medication between patients |
(184) |
Six patients converted to HBsAg+ during a 6-mo period |
Transmission occur during hospitalization at an acute-care facility; same staff cared for HBsAg+ and HBV-susceptible patients; no patients vaccinated |
Hepatitis B vaccination of all patients; review HBsAg status of chronic hemodialysis patients who require hospitalization; no sharing of equipment, supplies, or medication between patients |
(187) |
36 patients with liver enzyme elevations consistent with Non-A, Non-B hepatitis |
Environmental contamination with blood |
Utilize proper precautions (e.g., gloving of staff; environmental cleaning); monthly liver function tests (e.g., ALT) |
(308) |
35 patients with elevated liver enzymes consistent with Non-A, Non-B hepatitis during a 22-mo period; 82% of probable cases were anti-HCV+ |
Inconsistent use of infection control precautions, especially hand washing |
Strict compliance to aseptic technique and dialysis center precautions |
(311) |
HCV infection developed in 7/40 (18%) HCV-susceptible patients; shift specific attack rates of 29-36% |
Multidose vials left on top of machine and used for multiple patients; routine cleaning and disinfection of surfaces and equipment between patients not routinely done; arterial line for draining prime dripped into a bucket that was not routinely cleaned or disinfected between patients |
Strict compliance with infection control precautions for all dialysis patients; routine HCV testing |
(252,253) |
HCV infection developed in 5/61 (8%) HCV-susceptible patients |
Sharing of equipment and supplies between chronically infected and susceptible patients; gloves not routinely used; clean and contaminated areas not separated |
Strict compliance with infection control precautions for all dialysis patients; CDC does not recommend separation of equipment/supplies between HCV-infected and susceptible patients |
(252,253) |
HCV infection developed in 3/23 (13%) HCV-susceptible patients; shift specific attack rate 27% |
Supply carts moved between stations and contained both clean and blood-contaminated items; medications prepared in the same area used for disposal of used injection equipment |
Strict compliance with infection control precautions for all dialysis patients |
(252,253) |
HCV infection developed in 7/52 (13%) HCV-susceptible patients; shift specific attack rates 4-21% |
Medication cart moved between stations and contained both clean and blood-contaminated items; single-dose medication vials used for multiple patients; cleaning and disinfection of surfaces and equipment between patients not routinely done |
Strict compliance with infection control precautions for all dialysis patients |
(252,253) |
HCV infection developed in 9/90 (10%) HCV-susceptible patients. |
Cleaning and disinfection of surfaces and equipment between patients not routinely done; gloves not routinely used; medications not stored in separate clean area |
Strict compliance with infection control precautions for all dialysis patients; routine HCV testing |
(254) |
HCV infection developed in 8/107 (7.5%) HCV-susceptible patients |
Poor medication handling and infusion practices |
Proper training of personnel on aseptic technique and compliance with infection control precautions for dialysis setting |
(255) |