Commentary and Reflections: On Stratification and Complexity

Commentary and Reflections: On Stratification and Complexity


REBECCA M. HERZIG


All three of the “new engagements” comprising this section share two assumptions common to much “old” feminist scholarship: namely, that (a) oppression exists and (b) oppression should be challenged. Those assumptions often help to concentrate research in potent ways, Janet Shim and her colleagues point out, by placing and keeping “power and relations of domination and subordination at the center of the analysis” (Shim et al. 2015:73, Chapter 3, this volume). Yet while feminism’s emancipatory goals offer researchers compelling motivation and focus, they also present persistent conundrums for analyses of contemporary biomedicine. For within biomedicine, the chapters in Part I take pains to emphasize, relations of power are “messy” enough that hierarchies of domination and subordination are not always clear (Bell and Figert 2015:19, Chapter 1, this volume). Indeed, biomedical processes may be best conceived not in terms of hierarchical ladders but “in terms of networks, spirals, and complexity” (Bell and Figert 2015:26). These diffuse networks are “everywhere tempered and complicated by” pluralisms, partialisms and contingencies (Annandale and Hammarström 2015:42, Chapter 2, this volume, citing Clarke 2010:389). Even the most hegemonic formations are “immanent with and animated by” counter-formations, their own “‘modes of undoing’” (Shim et al. 2015:63, citing Murphy 2012:183, n. 3). Far from readily captured and pinned “at the center of analysis,” then, power in biomedicine flows and fluxes, forming the very subjects it regulates. Thus, for those of us, like Shim and colleagues, trying to challenge “‘relationships of exploitation of subordinate groups by dominant groups’” (Shim et al. 2015:73, citing Weber 2010:91), contemporary biomedicine presents some serious challenges. Who (or what) might accurately be characterized as “‘oppressed groups struggl[ing] to gain rights, opportunities, and resources,’” and who instead as “‘dominant groups … seek[ing] to maintain their position of control’” (Shim et al. 2015:73, citing Weber 2010:91)? What might “emancipation” even look like, given that biomedicine constitutes the very bodies and subjects that seek deliverance?


This brief comment cannot address those questions in their broadest strokes, of course.1 I will not even purport to address them in a more limited, context-specific way. I intend merely to draw attention to the tensions generated by the juxtaposition of “feminist” opposition to exploitative, hierarchical relations of power with analyses of biomedicine’s multidirectional, multi-sited, life-altering churn. While it might be argued that the analyst’s role is to cut through that frothy churn to grasp the relatively fixed structural mechanisms within, my suggestion here, based on the three chapters in Part I, is that the conceptual tensions produced by feminist analyses of biomedicine cannot be so easily wiped away. Drawing on elements of the three chapters, I try to show that such tensions, far from suggesting the irrelevance of feminist approaches to biomedicine, instead highlight their ongoing generativity.


Early critiques of medicalization, thumbnail histories of the concept invariably recount, tended to position professional physicians as the dominant agents of change. While the broader social control of deviance might well serve governmental as well as professional interests, the medicalization of social deviance typically was routed through the authority of the “technically competent” doctor (Bell and Figert 2015:21; see also Freidson 1970; Zola 1972; Illich 1975; Conrad and Schneider 1980). According to those early critiques, Bell and Figert summarize, physicians gained the “authority and professional power in modern society to define and control what is formally recognized as a disorder, sickness or deviance,” in a top-down, exclusionary manner (2015:21). To the extent that medical professionals transformed “‘normal’ everyday feelings and behaviors” into illnesses, early critiques suggested, it was often for their own “economic and professional benefit” (Bell and Figert 2015:21).


In contrast, more recent scholarship shifts the “analytic gaze” from medical professionals to other “key drivers” of social change (Bell and Figert 2015:23; Annandale and Hammarström 2015:41). The proliferation of pharmaceuticals, commercial genetics and new surgeries and devices is said to distribute processes of legitimation and decision-making once concentrated with doctors. Now patients (“consumers”) are actively responsible for their individual health and bodily “enhancement.” This ceaseless, increasingly commercialized pursuit suggests phenomena unfolding “from below” as much as through the imposition of narrow professional interests (Annandale and Hammarström 2015:42, citing Conrad 2013; Furedi 2006). As Bell and Figert aptly note, contemporary dynamics “do not easily fit into a conceptual frame of … governmental or medical professional control” (2015:25). For the affluent, at least, “life itself” has been transformed into an object of ongoing, personalized intervention (Franklin 2000; Rose 2007).


For feminists in particular, engagement with these developments is often framed by the concept of “biomedicalization,” first elaborated by Adele Clarke and her colleagues in a 2003 essay cited in some version by all three chapters in Part I. Worth stressing here is that Clarke and her colleagues employ biomedicalization not merely as a theoretical concept, but as a referent to an actual “historical shift” – a dramatic set of material changes in the organization and practice of contemporary medicine. “Power” and “control” in this new historical context are far from simple. As they describe it, biomedicine today is being reorganized “not only from the top down or the bottom up but from the inside out” (Clarke et al. 2003:162; emphasis in original). Causality in this context is equally complex: a “fundamental premise” of biomedicalization is that new technical capabilities, new institutional organizations, new political economies, new bodily identities and new social forms are all mutually and reciprocally constituted (2003:163). Attendant to those tangled co-productions are “new forms of agency, empowerment, confusion, resistance, docility, subjugation, citizenship, subjectivity, and morality” (2003:185).


In the midst of all that multidirectional, ongoing, mutual (re)constitution, what becomes of those old warhorses of feminist theory and praxis: domination and subordination? What might “oppression” look like in such a mobile field? Clarke and her colleagues certainly do not ignore the exclusionary actions of biomedicine, including the specific barriers and privileges framed by “race, class, gender, and other attributes” (2003:170). Borrowing terminology from Ginsburg and Rapp’s 1995 discussion of reproduction, they label the reconstituted forms of cooptation and exclusion emerging in contemporary biomedicine “stratified biomedicalization” (2003:170–1, citing Ginsburg and Rapp 1995). It is revealing, however, that most specific examples of “stratified biomedicalization” discussed in Clarke et al.’s essay do not address the sorts of embodied categories at the heart of so many feminist, antiracist, queer and disability rights critiques of biomedicine. Examples instead tend to concern individual confrontations with financial gatekeeping, such as “stratifying fee-for-service options for those who can afford them” (2003:171). Relationships between bodily difference, social stratification and disparities in health and mortality thus remain unspecified.


Enter the three chapters that comprise Part I

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Aug 3, 2016 | Posted by in PHARMACY | Comments Off on Commentary and Reflections: On Stratification and Complexity

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