Poor Development and Corporate Practices: Threats to a Pharmaceutical Organization



Poor Development and Corporate Practices: Threats to a Pharmaceutical Organization






It is never too latein fiction or in life—to revise.

–Nancy Thayer, novelist.


There is nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done at all.

–Peter F. Drucker, writer, professor, and consultant.


Bad development practices arise in all companies during drug discovery, development, marketing, and production. Unfortunately, it happens all too easily. This chapter presents one author’s list, which is not definitive but the author thinks representative. He tends to look first at the company as a whole and then focus on research and development (R and D). Similarly, one could create a more extensive list of the poor practices and threats in each function such as marketing, medical, and production. Boersig’s (2003) presentation, “Why NDAs Fail: 15 Pitfalls and How to Avoid Them,” is an example of the functional approach (Table 112.1). Most of these 15 points require extensive descriptions to determine whether or not the reader would agree with them. Table 112.2 provides other examples that illustrate selected poor practices in clinical development, and Table 112.3 shows a list of selected poor regulatory practices.

In considering the overall company, the poor practices described may be related to corporate culture, corporate policies, management decisions, and individuals. These problems happen across organizational levels and functions. None of these poor development practices are all-or-none issues; each problem may occur to a small or large degree. Most of these problems overlap two or three areas, but the author has classified the problems based on where he judges they primarily reside. Many of these (and other) examples are discussed more extensively in other chapters.


CORPORATE CULTURE: POOR PRACTICES AND THREATS


Not Balancing Time and Effort on Planning versus Doing

There is no doubt that some groups are guilty of allowing so much planning to occur that almost nothing of real substance is ever accomplished. The author has observed this problem of “paralysis by analysis” in some clinical groups charged with the planning and implementation of clinical trials. The groups always found additional questions to ask about a protocol. Some of the clinicians kept asking additional questions, continually challenged the trial’s details, and were never fully satisfied with the protocol. Because it is possible to pursue endlessly the elusive goals of designing the perfect clinical trial and finding the perfect site and investigator to conduct the trial, several trials either were never initiated or had to be done by another geographic site of the same company. It was difficult to know whether this problem was related to an underlying fear of initiating a flawed trial or to the individuals’ “flawed” personalities. Clearly, the corporate culture of that country’s site permitted this permissive and aberrant behavior to occur.








Table 112.1 Fifteen mistakes in filing a new drug application




















































1.


Not communicating with the FDA


2.


Avoiding the safety issue


3.


Lack of planning


4.


Omitting data or including unnecessary data


5.


Not paying attention


6.


Not documenting manufacturing processes


7.


Ignoring the investigators


8.


Forgetting conflicts of interest


9.


Hiding something


10.


Being too eager to disclose to the public


11.


Not thinking globally


12.


Not thinking about electronic submissions


13.


Rushing


14.


Not choosing wisely


15.


Filing a drug that is not needed


FDA, Food and Drug Administration.


Reprinted from Boersig C. Why NDAs fail: 15 pitfalls and how to avoid them. R&D Directions. 2003;Feb:26-42, with permission of AdvanceStar Publications.


The correct balance between “planning and doing” must switch to the side of doing as soon as initial plans have been drafted, reviewed, and approved. One strategy to move the balance of this equation to the side of action is to inform the group that its members will be judged by how rapidly and efficiently trials are initiated and how accurately they are conducted, but not, of course, by whether the data obtained support the hypothesis being tested. Regarding the example given in the previous paragraph, competent managers would have “forced” the people to stop talking about the trial and to start doing the trial, but this style of management was lacking. This situation continued for years, and the author observed these clinicians always finding excuses for not starting clinical trials that were assigned to them, indirectly forcing another company location to take over and conduct the trials.

But the opposite situation can happen too. The author has seen people whose motto seemed to be “Ready, Shoot, Aim.” They were starting clinical trials either before all the essential questions had been adequately addressed or before the company’s development strategy and goals were fully worked out and agreed upon.


Adopting Fads and Fashions that Do Not Suit the Company, Its Portfolio, or Its Culture

Many popular fads in management, science, marketing, and other areas are promoted to companies and even hyped within an organization as the best way to manage, develop, and sell drugs or to do any of a thousand different things. Exhibitors’ booths at professional conventions (such as the Drug Information Association’s annual meeting) display a myriad of products and services, many unproven, that are often presented as the most efficient technology and methodology that everyone should adopt (i.e., purchase) in order to get results and save time and money. Unfortunately, many if not most of these new ideas, technologies, and products do not deliver on their promises to improve drug development, and many become albatrosses to companies that buy in. The author does not want to name the guilty ones; most know which they are.

At the company level, it is the culture that seems to permit these behaviors, although some managers are more likely than others to be taken in by being the first to adopt new fads and approaches. If one thinks about a conservative company versus an aggressive, risk-taking company, then one can easily understand that the primary issue is more closely associated with culture than with managers’ behavior, but the two are closely related.

Medicine and science are also full of fads. Each year, there is a new wonder molecule or drug that is hyped, and the large
number of research grants for scientists to study this molecule demonstrates that the National Institutes of Health and other grant-giving organizations support these fads. Thus, one notes that many scientists orient their grants to track the most recent hot chemicals, drugs, or technological methods.








Table 112.2 Poor clinical practices in pharmaceutical developmenta
































































1.


Some companies rely too extensively on external industry benchmarks instead of focusing more on internal benchmarking data in assessing the company and to make decisions.


2.


Draft product labels (i.e., package inserts) are used for a number of years prior to preparing the regulatory submission, which leads to misleading impressions about the drug and its development because they include hoped for, rather than demonstrated, data.


3.


Many companies do not use the best development criteria (i.e., minimally acceptable criteria) for making decisions to advance or terminate a drug. Some use ideal, realistic, or desirable criteria, although some companies do not use any formal criteria.


4.


Not systematically creating a system to capture Institutional Memory in order to decrease the number of mistakes made by new or inexperienced staff. When experienced or senior staff retire, move, or die, is their learning lost, or is it captured to help prevent people from repeating errors made in the past? Are staff adequately trained?


5.


Failure to use “Zero-Based Inclusion Criteria” in creating clinical protocols. Too many people take the last protocol written and simply add on a few more criteria without awareness of how this impacts the size of the population available for entry into the trial.


6.


Failure to avoid “procedure bloat” in creating clinical protocols. Too often, the last protocol written is used as a model, and a few more procedures to be done during the trial are added for evaluation of new effects, without considering the need and importance of the data to be collected.


7.


Conducting excessive monitoring visits during a clinical trial when a smaller number would suffice. This is particularly true for large simple trials when only once-a-quarter visits are needed. (Even the FDA has expressed amazement on numerous occasions at the waste that occurs in this area.)


8.


Conducting unnecessary compassionate plea protocols without a careful review and assessment of whether the value of the data obtained justifies the efforts to be expended. While many discuss the “ethical responsibility” to help those who approach the company, few companies consider that those few patients who will be helped come at the expense of time delays caused by such programs, which means that many more patients will not receive the product (and any medical benefits) for a longer time period.


9.


Not reacting immediately to potentially serious adverse event signals until the signal is apparent to everyone in the medical community. A company must insist that it will know more about its own products than any other group or agency. This means using more active drug surveillance methods in Phase 4 and not merely relying on passive surveillance. Take immediate actions when issues arise or a possible signal is detected. No one wants to be accused by watchdog organizations of something the company was unaware of but should have been known. It may be too late at that time to start a clinical trial to evaluate an issue, and the issue often becomes rapidly elevated to a major problem.


10.


Not anticipating potential problems that may be observed in Phase 4 and developing a prospective risk management plan to monitor results of one’s drug after marketing (e.g., if one is aware of elevated liver enzymes in Phase 3, it is critical to develop a monitoring plan to learn the numerator and denominator of both liver transplants and hepatic deaths after marketing, even if none have previously occurred).


11.


Allowing staff to plan work to an excessive degree without a sense of urgency about conducting work.


12.


Allowing silos and fortresses to be built in clinical and other functional groups and not effectively maintaining positive internal teamwork and communications.


13.


Failing to develop methods to prevent tangents from being adopted and followed.


14.


Creating minutes of meetings that are sent for review and finalized but rarely or never used as opposed to creating lists of points of agreement and action points, with the responsible person and due dates listed, and then using this report as the next meeting’s agenda.


15.


Creating development plans and budgets without sufficient critiques, which leads to frequent revisions.


16.


Forming a data safety monitoring board without having a member who understands both regulations and drug development who can prevent inappropriate decisions by academicians who are inexperienced in pharmaceutical development.


17.


Spending time and money on “nice to know” clinical trials as opposed to “need to know” (i.e., essential) trials.


18.


Allowing insufficiently reviewed and considered protocols to be approved, which leads to an excessive number of amendments.


19.


Allowing too strong of an academic environment to flourish in one or more departments at the expense of a sense of urgency and focus on activities that will get the company’s products to market more rapidly.


aMany of the points listed would apply to most other functional areas in a company.


FDA, Food and Drug Administration.










Table 112.3 Poor regulatory practices in pharmaceutical development





























1.


Using traditional, unimaginative, and obvious regulatory strategies and approaches instead of seeking the most rapid, creative, and efficient approaches. Some of these approaches may never have been considered, but if they make sense, it is up to the company to defend them and try to convince regulatory agencies of their validity (e.g., using a meta-analysis as a pivotal trial, using surveys to obtain supportive data).


2.


Creating “fat” New Drug Applications and other marketing applications instead of determining how lean they can be and then validating the company’s perspective with regulatory agencies.


3.


Creating too “lean” of a marketing application instead of reaching an agreement ahead of time with an agency as to what studies and details are acceptable for the application.


4.


Not stressing the public health message (i.e., medical need) in all executive summaries of clinical documents sent to regulators and not working this message into discussions with the agency in an attempt to win the members’ hearts and minds.


5.


Skipping essential Phase 2 clinical trials and gambling that a Phase 3 pivotal trial will be successful to expedite a regulatory filing, even though many methodological questions for a protocol (e.g., top of the dose-response relationship, best patient population to study, how to titrate and taper the dose most effectively) are not yet known with any degree of certainty.


6.


Making assumptions about what the FDA actually meant by a statement or what the agency wants and/or expects the company to do and will accept in a marketing application.


7.


Not summarizing all agreements and any action points at the end of every meeting with regulators.


8.


Failing to ask the question: “What can we do that will get this product to market faster than anyone has previously thought possible, and what makes sense given the various regulations, guidelines, and practices?” But instead asking: “What will the regulatory agency allow us to do, and what are the regulatory requirements that we must fulfill?”


FDA, Food and Drug Administration.


One example in the medical world were some proposals a few years ago of prescribing drugs for the elderly differently than for younger adults based solely on the age of the patient. There is increasing evidence of some important pharmacokinetic differences between the elderly and younger adults, and these are becoming better studied and understood (Schwartz 2007). However, it has become apparent that numerous other factors than age alone help explain why elderly patients appear to differ from younger adults in their responses to drugs. These factors include the larger number of concomitant therapies used by the elderly (with their associated drug-drug interactions), the larger number of concomitant diseases, and other factors such as social isolation, poor hygiene, questionable nutritional status, debilitation, and others that are more common in the elderly. Fortunately, most proposals regarding prescribing differently to elderly patients based solely on their age are not being followed today.

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Oct 2, 2016 | Posted by in GENERAL SURGERY | Comments Off on Poor Development and Corporate Practices: Threats to a Pharmaceutical Organization

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